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Abstract
In the context of the New Economics of Banking, the study analyses cross-
border financial consolidation from the point of view of bank strategies. The
main hypothesis of the work is that, in the present decade, the Pan-European
landscape of the financial sector will be determined by what is happening in
a limited number of banks, this number being rather arbitrarily fixed at 100.
The basic issue to be clarified is not whether a second round of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions will occur after the present pause; but how it will
occur: according to an ‘evolution’or a ‘revolution’scenario. In the study, the
sample comprises the 100 largest banking groups in Europe, selected on the
basis of the Bankscope data. This sample is supposed to be composed of
subgroups with similar characteristics, which can be discovered by statistical
analysis, using clustering techniques. The clusters help identify peer groups.
+) The present text is a full and updated (until 30th June 2002) version of the study prepared
for  the  Ente  Einaudi  project  ‘Verso un sistema bancario e finanziario europeo?’ It  is  being
published in the series of the SUERF Studies by courtesy of Ente Luigi Einaudi.
*) Jean-Paul Abraham (*1930) is a Professor (em.) at the Universities of Namur and Leuven
and also at the College of Europe (Bruges), Belgium. He is a former Executive Director of Paribas
Bank Belgium and a former Adviser to Artesia Bank.
**) Peter Van Dijcke (*1966) holds a degree in commercial engineering and a MBA of the KU
Leuven. He has served as an economist at the Belgian Association of Savings Banks, the Belgian
Banking Association, and the Federation of the Coordination Centers in Belgium. He is now
Senior Economist at the Research Department of DEXIA Bank, under the directorship of Frank
Lierman. Peter Van Dijcke is a laureate of the Marjolin Prize (2000).Particularly  interesting  for  the  study  are  the  cases  where  banks  want  to
overcome the constraints of a domestic market, which, in the perspective of
European integration, no longer suffices to satisfy their ambitions and the
competition rules of the national and European authorities. After a general
discussion of motives, driving forces and discouraging factors in cross-border
financial  consolidation,  the  study  concentrates  on  four  topics,  mostly
discussed within the same conceptual and statistical framework: (i) a factual
analysis of the M&A activity of the late Nineties and the first years of the
present decade, where cross-border deals were overshadowed by domestic
transactions; (ii) a presentation, via self-organising maps, of the European
banking panorama in the year 2000 and of the panorama changes in the period
1995–2000. The clusters in this panorama feature at the same time national
and comparative advantage aspects. In the clusters of high efficiency British
and Nordic Banks predominate. In the clusters of higher vulnerability German
and some Italian banks are prominent; (iii) a discussion of the track record of
29 European banking groups, divided into three groups according to their
M&A activity  (domestic  M&A,  cross-border  M&A,  steady  state  without
much  M&A).  On  the  average,  the  performance  of  the  domestic
M&A reference group is stronger than the results of the other groups; (iv)
a more detailed discussion of four cases, all of them belonging to the cross-
border  M&A reference  group:  ABN-AMRO,  ING  and  FORTIS  in  the
Benelux  area,  NORDEA in  Scandinavia.  The  origin  of  the  consolidation
differentiates the three Benelux cases from the Scandinavian one: necessity to
overcome the limitations of the national domestic market in a perspective of
growth  on  the  one  hand,  new  perspectives  in  the  aftermath  of  the
Scandinavian banking crisis of the early Nineties on the other. On the basis of
the preceding analysis, the answer to the basic issue favours the ‘evolution’
scenario,  where  the  cross-border  M&A activity  remains  a gradual
enlargement of and a complement to the domestic market activity, but with an
increasing weight  of  cross-border  deals,  when  large  banks  become  more
sensitive to the limitations of their own national domestic market. In this way
Europe would gradually and partly become the enlarged home market of the
national champions and their challengers.Foreword
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Motives, driving forces and discouraging factors
1.1 Introducing the study
As is widely known, the financial sector is undergoing fundamental structural
change,  particularly  in  Europe.  This  change  is  also  transforming  the
Economics of Banking, which was traditionally based on the analysis of the
intermediation  process.  In  the  New  Economics  of  Banking,  autonomous
growth of the banking firm through mergers and acquisitions is paid much
attention to.
A vast literature has developed. It comprises, on the one hand, event studies,
which focus on the M&A experience of specific companies or on specific
M&A transactions,  and,  on
the  other  hand,  analytical
studies  based  on  the
statistical  and  econometric
treatment  of  extensive
databases of M&A cases. At
the beginning, the latter have
been  elaborated  mostly  on
the basis of US data and they have concentrated on domestic mergers. Now,
they increasingly cover cases in various countries of Europe and also include
cross-border transactions, with monetary and financial integration acting as
a catalyst.  Recently  (2000–2001),  the  existing  literature  and  the  factual
developments  have  been  extensively  reviewed,  first  by  the Allan  Berger
Group at the Federal Reserve and the Wharton Financial Institutions Center
in Philadelphia and afterwards in the monumental Report on Consolidation in
the  Financial  Sector (January  2001),  which  covers  the  experience  of
13 countries and has been compiled by a Working Party of the Group of Ten
(Central Banks) under the chairmanship of R.W. Ferguson (hence, the current
reference to the Ferguson Report). A more limited survey, focusing on bank
efficiency  aspects,  is  given  in  the  SUERF  Colloquium  book Adapting  to
Financial Globalisation (Van Dijcke, 2000).
The purpose of the present study is not to provide a ‘survey of these surveys’,
but to take their facts, figures and analytical findings, as well as those of other
9
“…If  we  knew  what  it  was  we  were  doing,  it
would not be called research, would it ?… “
(A.  Einstein  quote  with  1,470  www-hits  by
Google-search)sources, as a starting point for a complement from the point of view of bank
strategies.  From  our  experience  in  gathering  materials  and  preparing
preliminary studies for strategic plans and policies in a financial institution,
we  know  that,  for  such  a purpose,  event  studies  are  often  too  much
concentrated on a specific company or on a specific event. At the other end of
the spectrum, the often mixed results of large econometric research are too
ambiguous to steer future action in the institution. We have also observed that
top executives in financial institutions often fix their objectives and define
their policies by comparing their own internal situation with the size and
Structure, Conduct and, most of all, Performance (i.e. the SCP approach in
banking  strategy)  of  their  competitors  or,  in  a more  neutral  way,  of  the
members of the peer group to which they belong or wish to belong. The
headlines of a strategic plan are full of expressions such as: ”we want to be
among the top 5 of our peer group by the end of the year,…we want to be one
of the leading groups in Europe in the field of ...”
In this context, we believe – and this is the main hypothesis of our study – that
in the present decade, the Pan- European landscape of the financial sector, not
the landscape within a nation or a region, will be determined by what is
happening or will happen in a limited number of banks. We have, rather
arbitrarily, fixed that number at 100. This sample comprises the 100 largest
banks in Europe and is supposed to be composed of subgroups with similar
characteristics, which can be discovered, not only by intuition but also by
statistical analysis, for which we use the clustering technique. The clusters
help identify peer groups. We are particularly interested in the cases where
banks, as the main Benelux banks and the Scandinavian banks in the Nineties,
want  to  overcome  the  constraints  of  a domestic  market,  which,  in  the
perspective  of  the  European  market,  no  longer  suffices  to  satisfy  their
ambitions  and/or  the  competition  rules  of  the  national  and  European
authorities. In those cases, the peer group becomes an international group
engaged in cross-border autonomous growth, which is usually supported by
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In the same conceptual and statistical
framework we will, on the basis of a SCP classification, explore the track
record of the main banks of this kind and complement this analysis with
focused  case  studies  for  three  Benelux  entities  (ABN-AMRO,  ING  and
FORTIS) and a Scandinavian one (NORDEA). Hopefully, this will allow us
to draw conclusions about the main trends and factors and give some hints
and opinions about future developments. 
The  presentation  just  given  explains  the  structure  of  the  study.  In  the
remainder of this chapter we insert the analysis of cross-border M&Aactivity
10 Cross-border mergers and acquisitionsin the New Economics of Banking. We then discuss the motives, driving
forces and discouraging factors of M&Aactivity, according to a classification
derived from the Ferguson Report and, finally, we formulate the basic issue
we have to clarify in the study: will, after the present pause, the second round
of financial consolidation in Europe be an evolution in Europe or a European
revolution?
The following chapters are mainly empirical. They present:
  a factual analysis of the M&A wave of the late Nineties, followed by the
inflexion in the first years of the present decade (chapter 2);
  a presentation, via self-organising maps, of a European banking panorama
in 2000 and of panorama changes in the period 1995–2000 (chapter 3);
  in  the  same  statistical  framework,  a discussion  of  the  track  record  of
European  banking  groups,  whether  engaged  or  not  in  M&A activity
(chapter 4) and of selected cases in the Benelux area and in Scandinavia
(chapter 5).
The concluding chapter presents a round-up and a look to the future, in order
to express an opinion about the basic issue formulated at the end of chapter 1. 
1.2 Cross-border M&A in the new economics of banking
The New Economics of Banking (NEB in the following text) very strongly
emphasises  the  pressures  exerted  on  banks  by  the  decline  of  traditional
intermediation and the shift from a mainly bank-oriented towards a more
market-oriented financial sector.
In a remarkable essay, Llewellyn assesses this process as follows: “In various
ways…the  related  pressures  of  competition,  deregulation,  financial
innovation and technology have eroded some of the comparative advantages
of banks in their traditional financial intermediation business…” (Llewellyn,
1999, p. 20).
In  the  NEB  much  attention  is  paid  to  autonomous  growth,  supported  by
M&A activity, as a strategic response to these pressures. In most cases, these
pressures are a combination of country-specific and global components, the
latter  presumably  becoming  more  decisive  (ibidem,  p.  25).  Globalisation
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 11brings  to  the  fore  the  international  and  the  cross-industry aspects  of  the
process.
Banks react to these pressures by adapting their strategy in various ways. In
previous work (Abraham and Lierman, 1990 and Abraham, 1998) the basic
distinction is made between two types of strategy: the accommodating type
aims at adapting the micro-world of the banking firm to often unforeseen
developments in the macro-world of the economy and/or in the meso-world
of financial markets. The standard examples of such a strategy are cost cutting
and  internal  rationalisation  of  the  firm,  to  overcome  a sudden  drop  in
profitability.
The autonomous restructuring (or growth) type is explicitly oriented towards
maximising the comparative advantages of the bank and towards minimising
its  comparative  disadvantages  in  financial  markets.  It  focuses  on  organic
growth and/or external growth by mergers and acquisitions or co-operative
arrangements and alliances. The extreme form of organic growth is a stand-
alone  policy,  the  extreme  of  external  growth  results  in  the  emergence  of
megabanks or conglomerates through worldwide mergers or acquisitions. We
still  cling  to  that  distinction  but  in  the  view  of  developments  in  the  last
decade, we add two qualifications:
  Growing interdependence, and also some kind of rational herding, often
cause  strategies  to  mix,  with  variable  weights,  accommodating  and
12 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions
Figure 1.1: The two dominant trends in banking strategy: 
Designing a strategy matrix
Source: D.T. Llewellyn, ‘The New Economics of Banking’, 
SUERF Studies No. 5, 1999.autonomous  ingredients  (let’s look  at  what  the  peer  group  does  and
let’s work to be among the best, cf. supra). This leads to increased attention
on so-called relative X- cost- and profit inefficiencies and it stimulates
partly  accommodating,  partly  autonomous  catch-up  measures  by  the
weaker members of the peer group.
  Accommodating and autonomous strategies may alternate over time. As
the  2000–2001  experience  shows,  unexpected  events  such  as  the
September 11 catastrophe, occurring in a context of US and worldwide
recession, can force a bank to temporarily interrupt a policy of autonomous
growth, to face the immediate need of cost cutting in the wake of a sudden
drop  in  revenue.  M&A activity  appears  to  be  very  sensitive  to  such
difficulties. Even in the absence of important unexpected accidents, shifts
from  autonomous  growth  to  accommodating  policies  frequently  occur
when worldwide expanding and fast-growing conglomerates need a period
of internal rationalisation, streamlining and cost cutting: in other words
a time for digestion, a pause in the process of growth. This is even more
the case when the governing objective is, as in many companies listed on
the  international  stock  markets,  the  increase  of  shareholders’ value,
controlled  in  public  opinion  by  the  regulatory  quarterly  publication  of
results.  This  procedure  introduces  the  constraint  of  almost  ‘instant’
profitability and even leads to the practice of early profit warnings.
In  the  field  of  M&A activity,  as  in  many  other  fields,  the  NEB  helps
understand the interplay of motives, driving forces and discouraging factors,
which influence this activity, and reduces this to its basic elements.
For example, in its 2000 report on mergers and acquisitions, the ECB singles
out size, economies of scope and risk and revenue diversification as the main
motives for cross-border M&A (see table 1.1 in section 1.3).
Astandard diagram of the NEB confronts and combines strategies focused on
size and those oriented towards diversification (see figure 1.1 reproduced
from Llewellyn, 1999, p. 72).
This leads to a discussion of the key objective of each of these strategies and
the  reservations  to  be  made  on  their  effects.  In  standard  NEB  analysis,
a strategy of size mainly aims at realising economies of scale. Until recently,
most empirical studies concluded that economies of scale only materialise in
M&A transactions involving small banks, because the cost function of the
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 13banking firm (and also of the banking industry) is U-shaped and engenders
diseconomies  when  size  becomes  very  large.  This  conclusion  is  now
questioned,  particularly  in  the  EMU,  where  monetary  and  financial
integration is changing the dimension of the ‘relevant’ market and raises the
minimal size to be ‘somebody’ in that market.
Diversification aims at economies of scope and at spreading risk and revenue.
The  standard  NEB  approach  focuses  on  functional  diversification  (cross-
industry), as in bancassurance projects. However, nearly the same arguments
can  be  applied  to  geographical  diversification  and/or  the  cumulation  of
geographical and functional criteria, as realised in some large international
conglomerates.  Reservations  in  this  field  question  the  existence  and  the
importance of economies of scope and highlight the difficulties of controlling
and  developing  diversified  businesses  in  different  countries  and  regions
without incurring increasing costs. Conflicts arising from different business
and national cultures, traditions and working practices may enhance these
problems  (Llewellyn,  p.  75).  The  diagram  suggests  that  in  many  cases
a balance has to be struck between size and diversification, to avoid the
implementation of one strategy from creating diseconomies and problems in
the other.
For our study, this type of NEB discussion contributes to a clarification of
basic  issues  by  offering  a general  framework  for  economic  thinking  and
research.  However,  it  obviously  remains  too  general  and  too  sketchy  to
provide  more  than  general  guidelines  for  our  work.  The  more  detailed
discussion  of  motives  and  factors  in  the  next  section  may  throw  some
additional light on the determinants and the present effects of the M&A.
Above all, we expect a more in-depth insight from our quantitative analysis
and our case studies in the next chapters.
1.3Motives, driving forces and discouraging factors
Most analytical studies focus on the effects of mergers and concentrate on the
efficiency  issue,  by  searching  for  economies  of  scale  or  scope  and  for
reduction of relative X- cost- and profit inefficiencies.
Studying bank strategies, not only in their effects, but also in their initiation
and  their  implementation,  we  prefer  a broader  approach,  which,  besides
effects, also includes motivation, driving forces and discouraging factors in
14 Cross-border mergers and acquisitionsmergers and acquisitions. We mention other forms of co-operation, such as
co-operative arrangements and alliances, only briefly, because so many of
them are temporary and/or disappear rather soon or end up in a merger or an
acquisition.
Table 1.1, extracted from a recent ECB report, compares the main motives of
cross-border M&A with those of domestic deals. We extend this presentation
by putting what we have found in the literature and in current information in
a synoptic table, ordering the elements in a classification, inspired by the
Ferguson Report and the Berger studies (table 1.2).
On this basis a few general comments can be made:
  Table 1.1 shows a striking difference between motives in domestic and
cross-border  M&A, at  least  in  banking  stricto  sensu,  less  so  in
consolidation cross-industry. In domestic transactions, cost reductions by
economies of scale and rationalisation are the prominent motives; in cross-
border  activity  the  size  motive  prevails,  not  explicitly  for  realising
economies of scale but for increasing market shares and market power
outside the home market, i.e. to be big enough in the market.
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 15
Table 1.1 Main motives and possible rationalisations for the four types of M&A
Source: ECB, Mergers and acquisitions involving the EU banking industry, December 2000, p. 20.
International bank M&A
Size, i.e. the need to be big enough in the
market, is the main motive.
Matching the size of clients and following
up clients.
Possible rationalisation within administrative
functions. 
Domestic bank M&A
Economies of scale linked to costs are the
main motive.
Cutting distribution networks and
administrative functions (rationalisation),





























Economies of scope through cross-selling
together with size are the two main motives.
Risk and revenue diversification.
The M&A offer few rationalisations because
institutions are in different countries and
subject to different regulations and practices. 
Domestic consolidation 
Economies of scope through cross-selling
are the motive.
Risk and revenue diversification.
Optimum usage of complementary
distribution networks.
Possible rationalisations within
administrative functions may lead to

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TThis illustrates a current practice in banking: cost cutting begins at home,
let’s go abroad to search for future revenue enhancement, when we have
reached a limit in the home market, because this market is becoming too
small  or  not  sufficiently  profitable  for  us,  or  because  the  government
opposes further concentration.
In  this  respect,  an  approach,  which  exclusively  links  a size-oriented
strategy with economies of scale, is too narrow, although recent literature
(e.g. Vander Vennet and al. at the University of Ghent, recently in H.P.
Huizinga, J.H.M. Nelissen and RVander Vennet, June 2001) emphasise
that, at least in Europe, economies of scale are not limited to mergers
involving small banks, but are also possible in M&A of big banks (which
is generally the case in cross-border transactions).
In  these  cases,  attention  is  primarily  paid  to  economies  of  scale  in
wholesale commercial banking, capital market activities, derivatives and
asset management, which may partly explain the penetration of American
merchant banks in Europe.
In general, however, the accent is put on global market power. In this
respect,  ambitions  of  European  big  bank  managers  are  increasing,
especially when, in designing their strategies, they more and more refer to
an international peer group (cf. supra).
  Studying M&A activity as a comprehensive process, and not only via its
effects on efficiency, highlights the importance of so-called environmental
factors in this process. We share the opinion of Hasan, I., Lozano-Vivas,A.
and Pastor, J.T. in their 2001 article that ‘most cross-country comparisons
of  bank  performance  to  date,  have  ignored  the  existence  of  unique
economic, regulatory, supervisory and demographic (i.e. environmental)
conditions  in  each country  in  evaluating  bank  performance‘(p.159).
Unfavourable  environmental  factors  in  the  country  of  destination
discourage foreigners to penetrate and limit M&A cross-border activity.
They  increase  the  home  field  advantage  and  protect  domestic  banks,
particularly when these banks are technically efficient. As shown in the
synoptic table 1.2, legal and regulatory impediments, defensive moves
from authorities and other institutional and cultural rigidities rank high in
the list of discouraging factors for cross-border M&A activity.
  In this context, the experience in Europe that cross-border M&Ahave been
relatively less numerous and active, and that they successfully occurred
rather by exception, can be explained by the very fact that the impact of the
positive  driving  forces  seems  to  have  been  rather  diffuse,  while  the
influence of institutional impediments and cultural constraints has been
overwhelming.
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considered technology, IT and telecommunications as a very important
positive factor favouring domestic bank M&A, while the impact of the
main discouraging factors, cultural constraints and legal and regulatory
impediments, was rather diffuse. The opposite held true in cross-border
transactions,  with  dominant  scores  for  cultural  constraints  (more  than
65%) and legal and regulatory impediments (about 60 %).
  The  present  pause  in  cross-border  activity  and  the  way  back  to
accommodating strategies of cost cutting cannot be fully explained within
the conceptual framework of this section. It has to be linked with cyclical
factors, such as the US and worldwide 2001 recession, and accidents, such
as the September 11 events. Nevertheless, it also reflects the fact that, in
several  cross-border  experiments,  a large  gap  had  developed  between
initial motives and plans and their effects through time. This does not
necessarily  mean  that  those  motives  and  plans  were  wrong  or  have
become outdated. It implies that, first, streamlining and cost cutting must
fill the gap.
1.4 The basic issue
As we link the present pause
with  cyclical  factors  and
accidents, the M&A wave of
the late Nineties has not, in
our opinion, represented the
final  stage  of  bank
consolidation in Europe. At
any rate, a second round will
occur.
The basic issue is how it will
occur.  Will  it  be  by  an
evolution, as  in  the  Nineties  when  the  cases  of  significant  cross-border
M&A remained limited in number, if not in size, and when going ‘cross-
border’ in M&A activity was still exceptional? In that case, the financial
landscape of Europe will be altered only gradually and partially. The mosaic
of the financial sector in Europe will then essentially remain composed of
national pieces, often dominated by the national champion and his national
challengers. 
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“…The  rationale  for  M&A: Too  many  large
national banks, no big European bank…”
(J. de Larosière & E. Barthalon; 22
nd SUERF
Colloquium, April 2000)
“…Partly  thanks  to  residual  protectionism,
Europe’s banking  and  insurance  have  yet  to
exploit  borderless  finance.  Only  when  that
happens will the revolution truly begin…“
(The Economist, April 2001)Or will the true revolution really begin, maybe through a series of big bangs,
which involve, directly or indirectly, most of the present 100 top European
banks and drastically change the European financial landscape? In that case,
the  scene  will  presumably  be  dominated  by  the  competition  in  size  and
market power in an international group of peers, which will also transform the
national settings.
In  short,  after the  present  pause,  will  the  second  round  of  financial
consolidation  in  Europe  be  an  evolution  in  Europe  or a European
revolution?
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2.1 Domestic M&A versus cross-border M&A:
The picture of the late 90s
The  overall  picture  of  the  Nineties  is  well  known  and  has  been  recently
confirmed and extensively documented by research and official publications
(IMF
1, Group of Ten
2, ECB
3 and BIS
4). The salient features for Europe are
(see also figures 2.1 and 2.2):
  An intensified M&Aactivity in Europe between 1990 and 1999 with 2,736
transactions registered by the Group of Ten for a total value of 572 bn.
USD. The last three years (1997–1999) represented 68% of total value and
33% of the number of transactions.
  Cross-border deals were largely overshadowed by domestic transactions,
both in the number of transactions and in total value. Domestic deals
accounted for more than two-thirds of the total value and the number of
transactions.  This  evolution  has  clearly  led  to  an  increased  financial
concentration  within  individual  European  countries.  Domestic
consolidation was (and still is) based on the conviction that a strong home
market is necessary before moving abroad and on fear of the control of
banks by foreigners (Boot, 1999). It also shows that the single market
programme has initially triggered a strong domestic consolidation process.
  Predominance  (81%)  of
transactions  within  the
same  industry,  both  in
cross-border  and  in
domestic  deals.
Predominance  (62%)  of
bank-bank transactions in
total  domestic  activity
(within  industry  and
cross-industry)  and  of
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“Over the observed period [1995–1999], there is
little  evidence  of  a trend  towards  cross-border
M&A within the European Economic Area, EU or
euro  area.  It  seems  that  in  many  countries
banking groups have first sought to consolidate
their  position  within  national  borders  before
making a strategic move to respond to further to
the  creation  of  the  single  market  and  the
introduction of the single currency.”
(ECB, December 2000)
1 “Euro-area banking at the crossroads’, IMF, March 2001.
2 “Report on consolidation in the financial sector”, Group of Ten, January 2001.
3 “Mergers and acquisitions involving the EU banking industry – Facts and implications”,
ECB, December 2000.
4 “The coming transformation of continental European banking”, BIS, June 1998.insurance-insurance  (40%)  deals  in  total  cross-border  activity  (within
industry and cross-industry). Noteworthy is that cross-border M&A were
more often carried out outside Europe than within. These transactions have
been considered as mainly driven by a search for higher margins.
  In cross-border transactions cross-industry (international consolidation),
predominance  of  transactions  involving  banks  acquiring  non-bank
institutions (insurance companies, securities houses and others), at least in
the number of deals: the number of cross-border deals bank – non-bank
account for 42 % of the total number of transactions, but only for 18% of
the total value. Insurance companies with 41% of total value record the
most  important  value  in  cross-border/cross-industry  transactions,  with
only 18% of the number of transactions.
  Striking differences among the European countries as far as the relative
importance of cross-border transactions is concerned: high cross-border
activity in the Netherlands (65% of total value of transactions, of which
more than 2/3 are related to insurance transactions), Germany (50% of
which  half  is  related  to  insurance  transactions),  Belgium  (40%)  and
Scandinavia (47% for Sweden).
Also to be noted is the low value of domestic transactions (within industry)
in the already highly consolidated countries as the Netherlands, Belgium and
Sweden.  More  surprising  is  the  relative  low  value  of  domestic  deals  in
Germany and the absence of cross-border deals in Spain until 1999. Both
countries  have  recently  been  quite  active  in  closing  this  gap  (Germany
through  its  insurance  ‘coup’ on  banking  and  Spain  through  its  banking
expansion in Latin America).
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Figure 2.1: Total value of M&A deals by sector and by country
(1990 – 1999, in Mio USD*)
5
5 All figures in this report are in US format.Source: Group of Ten
* Data based on 13 reference countries (US, Canada, Japan, Australia, UK, Italy, France, Germany,
Switzerland, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and Sweden). Total value is based on the acquiring firm. 
  Domestic M&A took, in the majority of cases, the form of a merger
(although  large  differences  were  recorded  among  European  countries),
while cross-border deals, within industry or cross-industry, were mainly
completed through acquisitions.
  ‘Friendly’ M&A were far more common than hostile takeovers.
Besides the major impact of
EMU,  euro,…also  several
country-specific  elements
influenced  this  M&A wave
in  the  90s.:  (i)  the  early
90s consolidation  wave  in
smaller countries such as the
Netherlands, (ii) the banking
crisis  in  the  early  90s’ in
Scandinavia, (iii) the round
of  privatisation  and
demutualisation  in  various
countries,  creating  new
potential targets (Spain, Italy,
UK,  Ireland,  Scandinavia,
France, Austria,…), (iv) the
growing  need  of  second
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Figure 2.2: Value of European M&A deals by country 
(1990 – 1999, in Mio USD*)
Figure 2.3: From domestic 
to cross-border consolidation? 
The domestic consolidation status
* “The end of the beginning” (The Banker, 2002)
Source: Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, FORTIS, KBC,
The Banker, and ECBhome markets and the consequent expansion into emerging markets: Central
and Eastern Europe
6, Latin America, Southeast Asia, (v) the level of public-
sector and co-operative banking (Germany, Italy, France).
Following the observation that banks first tend to consolidate domestically,
three  groups  of  countries  can  be  identified  with  regard  to  the  status  of
domestic consolidation (figure 2.3): (1) a large group of smaller countries,
where domestic consolidation has been substantially completed (Belgium,
The Netherlands, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and Greece), (2)
a small group of large countries where domestic consolidation has gained
speed in recent years, but is not assumed to be finished (Iberia, UK and
France) and finally (3) Germany and Italy, both with a low concentration
ratio. However, consolidation in Italy has been gaining speed and has almost
reached  a concentration  ratio  that  is  similar  to  that  in  France,  while  in
Germany  important  remaining  domestic  consolidation  barriers  are  under
review. 
In an attempt to avoid some
discouraging  factors  of
cross-border  M&A,  cross-
border  joint  ventures  and
strategic alliances are often
considered  as  a valid
alternative. But research and
data  on  joint  ventures  and
strategic  alliances  in
banking are scarce. This also
holds  for  research  on  the
efficiency  impact  of  these
alliances,  the  comparison
with  M&A activity  and  the  likelihood  as  to  whether  these  alliances  will
possibly lead to cross-border merger operations. 
According  to  the  Group  of  Ten  report,  823  joint  ventures  and  strategic
alliances
7 were recorded between 1990 and 1999 in Europe
8. In contrast with
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Table 2.1: Number of cross-border M&A
versus cross-border joint ventures
& strategic alliances* (1990–1999)
Merger & Joint ventures &
Acquisitions strategic alliances
Europe 778 487
North America 371 420
Pacific Rim 94 301
All 1,243 1,208
Source: Group of Ten
* M&A data based on the acquiring firm
6 See text box at the end of the chapter.
7 In  the  report  of The  Group  of Ten  defined  as  agreements  where  two  or  more  entities
combined  resources  to  form  a new,  mutually  advantageous  business  arrangement  to  achieve
predetermined objectives.
8 Europe includes Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Sweden and
Switzerland.the M&A activity, cross-border transactions for joint ventures and strategic
alliances were, in the aggregate, more common than domestic joint ventures
and strategic alliances (487 cross-border vs 336 within border). But this is no
surprise as these alliances are often used when M&Amay be difficult, complex
and involving several countries. Looking at all the cross-border deals, cross-
border joint ventures and strategic alliances almost match the number of cross-
border M&A(table 2.1). However, the match was not equal in the three regions
considered. Both in the Pacific Rim and in North America, cross-border joint
ventures and strategic alliances were more common than cross-border M&A.
In Europe, the number of cross-border M&A outnumbered the joint ventures
and strategic alliance deals. 
A second  blind  spot  in  the  research  literature  is  the  cross-border
shareholding of the financial landscape. Again, data are often incomplete,
complex (cf. direct and indirect shareholding) and, more important, quite
volatile. Also the ultimate goal of the shareholding stake is often very unclear
and may vary between an investment opportunity, a strategic option, a pre-
emptive move towards M&A or just ‘exchanging business cards’. The little
available research points out that size is, of course, a key determinant of the
decision to expand abroad, but also that banks with a larger share of non-
interest income are more likely to have foreign shareholdings (Focarelli &
Pozzolo, 2000). The latter assumes that those banks have a more aggressive
strategy in both home and foreign markets. Other findings are in line with the
M&A literature,  viz.  that  cross-border  shareholding  tends  to  come  from
efficient banks in their country of origin and is directed towards markets
where the banking sector is less efficient and expected profits are higher.
On the whole, the general picture, which has emerged from the M&A wave
of the Nineties, still features the heavy dependence of European banks on
their home market revenues.
Recent data show that only 30 banks worldwide have more than one-third of
their total assets outside their domestic base. The European banks from this
limited list are presented in table 2.2. Furthermore, it has been estimated from
the  regional  breakdown  of  European  banks’ revenues,  that  the  top
50 European banks generate 67% of their business in their home market, 15%
in  the  rest  of  Europe  and  18%  outside  Europe
9.  But,  within  Europe  and
Euroland,  the  definition  of  ‘home’ market  for  some  pan-regional  and
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9 EU Economic Papers, No. 143, May 2000.European  banks  (such  as  NORDEA,  Dexia  and  FORTIS)  is  increasingly
difficult to define. The notion ‘domestic’ is changing rapidly in the light of
EMU, euro and the consequent consolidation of European stock exchanges.
Banks increasingly talk about their second home market and their emerging
home market. This evolution is already in full process for the Nordic banks
and the Belgian/Dutch banks, where the definition of the home market has
been extended towards respectively the whole Nordic region and the Benelux
(see Chapter 5). In contrast, Germany, Italy, France and Spain have continued
their  domestic  consolidation  since  1999,  as  they  were  somewhat  lagging
behind the other EU-countries in their ‘national’ consolidation process.
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Table 2.2: Ranking of banks according to total assets outside their domestic base*.
Name Country Foreign Foreign Staff
assets (%) Income (%) abroad (%)
1 UBS CH 80.5 56.5 58.0
2 Standard Chartered UK 80.0 90.0 95.0
3 Crédit Suisse Group CH 78.7 42.9 58.8
4 Deutsche Bank DE 71.9 57.8 48.5
5 ING Bank NL 64.1 44.7 61.0
6 ABN Amro Bank NL 64.0 65.7 66.2
7 BNP Paribas FR61.6 37.0 38.8
8 HSBC** UK 55.6 62.6 56.9
9 KBC Bank BE 54.7 40.7 42.2
10 Allied Irish Banks IR52.9 56.6 68.8
11 SCH ES 52.7 62.4 66.0
12 RZB  Group AU 47.3 – 77.5
13 Dresdner Bank DE 43.0 33.2 17.3
14 BBVA ES 41.4 – 68.8
15 Bank  of  Ireland IR37.9 22.9 –
16 Erste Bank Group AU 37.7 35.9 71.0
17 Fortis Bank NL/BE 37.2 56.2 46.5
18 Anglo  Irish Banking IR36.5 46.7 39.9
19 HypoVereinsbank DE 34.4 30.0 51.6
* Data for 2000/2001
** Outside Europe
Source: The Banker, February 20022.2 Waiting for ‘The Big One’: The picture of the millennium turn
In 2001, M&A activity in all
sectors  collapsed  across
Europe. The  banking  sector
was clearly not immune from
this  trend.  M&A deals
remained  to  a very  large
extent  domestic,  while  the
cross-border  deals  were
mainly characterised by their
failure to be completed (see
table 2.3). The M&Aactivity
in  the  last  two  years  can
largely  be  reduced  to  three
forms: (1) a limited number
of  ‘strategic’ cross-border
M&A, involving at least one
large  player  and  aimed  at
achieving  an  ‘entrance
ticket’ or  strategic
positioning  within  an  EMU
country,  (2)  a majority  of
domestic  M&A activity
aimed  at  finalising  the
domestic  consolidation
status,  reducing  local
retail excess  capacity,
consolidation  of  central
functions and resolving bad
debt solvency problems and (3) plenty of M&A rumours linking European
banking groups.
Furthermore, table 2.3 also shows the emergence of two important elements:
(1) the  growing  involvement  of  the  authorities  both  on  a national  and
a European level on the basis of competition policy (e.g. failed M&Asuch
as Lloyds – Abbey National, SEB – Swedbank, Sampo – Storebrand),
alongside the implicit regulations by some national banking authorities
anxious  to  get  a grip  on  the  restructuring  and  consolidation  of  the
domestic  banking  industry  (e.g.  by  blocking  potential  domestic
M&A deals in Italy and by the interference in the BNP-Paribas-Société
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From M&A fatigue at the end of the 90s to
anew momentum ?
  M&A fatigue at the end of the 90s….
“Do mergers help consumers ?” 
(FT, July 1998)
“Merger is not the only route” 
(BSCH, February 2000)
“Marrying in haste”  (WSJ, April 2000)
“Merger failures put focus on overcrowded
banking sector”  (FT, May 2000)
“Europe’s cooling urge to merge” 
(The Banker, May 2000)
  …but the tone changed again with the new
millennium
“More mergers to come” 
(FT, December 2000)
“Let the revolution begin” 
(The Economist, April 2001)
“Getting ready for a big merger” 
(European Banker, May 2001)
“Who will merge next?” 
(The Banker, June 2001)
“European investment banks foresee
consolidation wave”  (WSJ, June 2001)
“Get ready for the universal bank” 
(E&Y, September 2001)
“Fusions bancaires à l’horizon” 
(La Tribune, October 2001)Générale  deal,  the  CDC-CNCE  merger  and  the  state  shareholding  in
Crédit Lyonnais in France);
(2) the  increasing  likelihood  of  a M&A failure  as  size  of  the  two  banks
involved increases (e.g. Unicredito – Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank –
Commerzbank – Dresdner Bank, National Bank of Greece – Alpha bank). 
Overall the M&Aactivity in the two last years seems to be an extension of the
90s’ wave, be it at a slower pace.
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Table 2.3: M&A in the European banking landscape in 2001 and 2002 
(until February 2002)
Name/Acquirer Country Name/Target Country Year M&A ?
Domestic M&A
Dexia BE/FRArtesia BC BE 2001 Acquisition
Banca Intesa IT Comit IT 2001 Acquisition
Bank of Scotland UK Halifax UK 2001 Merger
Unicredito IT Rolo Banco 1473 IT 2001 Acquisition announced
Allianz DE Dresdner Bank DE 2001 Acquisition
Munich Re DE HVB DE 2001 25.7% stake
San Paolo IMI IT Cardine IT 2001 Acquisition
Sabadell ES Banco Herrero ES 2001 Acquisition
CDC FRCNCE FR 2001 Merger
BPI-SGPS PO Banco Espirito Santo PO 2001 Merger
Abbey National UK Alliance & Leicester UK 2002 Pending
Banca di Roma IT Bipop-Carire IT 2002 Acquisition
Monte Paschi IT Banca Nazionale de Lavoro IT 2002 Pending
Cross-Border M&A
Svenska Handelsbanken SE Midtbank DK 2001 Acquisition
Dexia BE/FRKempen/Labouchere NL 2001 Acquisition
Deutsche Bank DE Zurich Fin. Services Group CH 2001 Acquisition
Failed M&A
National Bank of Greece GRAlpha Bank GR 2001 Merger
Unicredito IT Commerzbank DE 2001 Acquisition
Lloyds TSB UK Abbey National UK 2001 Acquisition
Abbey National UK Bank of Scotland UK 2001 Acquisition
Sampo FI Storebrand NO 2001 Acquisition
SEB SE Swedbank SE 2001 Merger
Deutsche Bank DE Commerzbank/Dresdner DE 2001 Acquisition/merger
Note: The list is not exhaustive
Source: Financial PressNevertheless, all the large European banking groups are facing increasing
pressure to continue on the acquisition path or to seek a merger of equals if
they wish to take a prominent role in the European banking landscape. It is
quite clear that the second round of consolidation will have a more prominent
cross-border dimension. But the fear of losing its own identity, combined with
the burden of cost management, the best-practice syndrome on the cost to
income ratio and the bleak economic outlook, temporarily created a pause in
the banking cross-border consolidation process. So, it seems that the banking
scene may be waiting for ‘The Big One’ to re-ignite the process.
Box– The ‘second home market’and the case of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
M&A wave of the late 90s and the millennium turn 29
For European banks, one of the ‘natural’second home markets outside the present EU
should be Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). CEE has recently been subject to an
‘externally driven consolidation process’
10, ignited by a few European banks searching
to  escape  from  the  home  market  margin  and  consolidation  pressures,  seizing  the
opportunities provided by the privatisation programmes in various CEE countries, and
counting on the economic prospects from the integration process into the EU. The entry
of foreign banks in CEE reflects the desire of both large international and regional
banks to enter profitable markets, and of the local authorities to improve the efficiency
and  stability  of  their  financial  systems,  as  well  as  to  help  reduce  the  cost  of
Table 2.4: Top 10 foreign banks in CEE (September 2001)
Total assets in Region as % of
Regional market region bank’s total
share (%) ($ bn.) assets
KBC 11.7 19.2 11
HypoVereinsbank 9.9 16.3 2
Unicredito 7.7 12.7 7
Société Générale 7.7 12.7 3
Citibank 7.6 12.5 1
Erste Bank 7.4 11.5 19
IntesaBci 5.4 8.9 3
ING 4.4 7.2 2
RZB 4.0 6.5 19
Commerzbank 3.8 6.3 1
Source: WSJ, The Banker, and Bank of Austria
10 Deutsche Bank – EU Enlargement Monitor, August 2001.30 M&A wave of the late 90s and the millennium turn
recapitalising weak domestic banks
11. Actually, more than 50% of the CEE regional
banking market is controlled by foreign (European) banks, making it the most open
banking system in the world. For countries high on the ranking in the EU accession
scenario (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia), this figure even increases
to more than 70%. Although, bank privatisation programmes are almost completed, the
consolidation process is considered to be still far from ended
12.
Most large European banking groups remained at the sideline during the recent CEE
consolidation process. Only HVB (due to the acquisition of Bank Austria), Société
Générale, IntesaBCI and ING are in the top 10 of foreign banks in CEE, but the impact
on their total assets is marginal (table 2.4). Mainly, medium-sized European players
(KBC, Unicredito, Erste Bank and RZB) have drawn the CEE card. But the global
economic slowdown, hampering domestic cost control management and the time lag of
the CEE’s return on investment have not facilitated pursuing the strategic vision of
their second home market. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the large European
players will remain apathetic for CEE in the course of the EU enlargement scenario.
This mix, the dominant presence of medium-sized European players, the absence of
large European players and the EU enlargement scenario may spice the cross-border
consolidation process in Europe and CEE.
11 BIS Papers, No. 4, ‘The banking industry in the emerging market economies: competition,
consolidation and system stability – an overview, August 2001.
12 With the exception of the already highly concentrated Estonian banking sector (from 42
banks in 1992 to 6 banks in 2001). For the other countries, the BIS reckons that the market-driven
consolidation has only started, as there are still too many banks.3 Panorama of the European banking groups
3.1 The road to the panorama: data scope and limitations
The basic financial data of the top 100 European banking groups, ordered
according to their total assets in the year 2000 are summarised in the annex
of this paper. Looking at these data, one only gets a limited view on the global
panorama of European banking (figure 3.1). Therefore the main questions to
be answered in this chapter are: How can we regroup the huge amount of data
in a comprehensive manner and ultimately in a simple and understandable
two-by-two matrix without reducing the essence of the data? How could we
visualise the similarities, dissimilarities and evolution among these banking
groups? Do nationalities emerge when comparing large European banks? Can
strategic conclusions be drawn from clustering large European banks? And
most importantly, what can historical data reveal on past and future cross-
border M&A activity?
For several years, data mining has steadily been making inroads into financial
services institutions. Increasingly financial institutions are using data mining
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Figure 3.1: Viewing the panorama through a keyhole…..
(European top 100, based on the data in annex 1)
SIZE CTI Conditional search* Conditional search*
(largest)(lowest) (worst) (best)  
* Satisfy all conditions.
Source: Bankscope, own calculations techniques for different applications: credit scoring, default risk, bankruptcies
prediction, CRM (Customer Relationship Management), forecasting, credit
and country analysis, customer profiling and scoring, quality control, process
engineering, fraud detection, selection of investment opportunities,…. One of
the techniques applied in data mining is the use of neural networks, which
differs from traditional statistically based programming because they use non-
linear techniques. In the present chapter, neural network (more specific Self-
Organising Maps (SOM) also called Kohonen network
13) is used not for credit
scoring, but for scoring the European top 100 on a number of ratios. Simply
stated, SOM reduces and visualises a high-dimensional data set into a two-
dimensional map. In order to compare the top 100 European banking groups
on a multi-dimensional scale, we have chosen to use this SOM-technique to
visualise the high dimensionality of the large input data into such a two-
dimensional  map.  The  map  has  been  constructed  under  the  underlying
assumption that clusters are formed from patterns that share common features.
The map attempts to represent all the available observations with optimal
accuracy,  using  a restricted
set  of  financial  institutions
(in  our  case  100  European
banking  groups).  The
technique arranges financial
institutions  on  the  map  so
that ‘similar’banks are close
to each other and dissimilar
banks  far  from  each  other.
This results in the creation of
clusters containing a number
of  banks  with  comparable
input data.
What are the advantages of using SOM ?
  SOM  translates  multi-dimensional  input  data  into  a simple  two-
dimensional map;
  SOM can detect unexpected structures or patterns;
  SOM is a non-parametric method, i.e. no a priori assumptions about the
distribution of the data need to be made;
  SOM  recognises  missing  values  or  invalid  entries  and  treats  them
appropriately in the analysis;
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13 Prof.  Teuvo  Kohonen,  Helsinki  University  of  Technology,  mathematically  defined  the
underlying algorithm in 1982.
“…The use of models is pragmatic and pluralist.
In  an  ever-changing  environment,  no  single
model  can  possibly  assimilate  in
a comprehensive way all factors that matter for
policy. Forming judgements about those factors,
and their implications for policy is not something
that  can  be  abdicated  to  models  or  even
modellers. But models are indispensable tools in
that process…”
(Bank of England, 1999)  SOM copes well with ‘fuzzy’ data or chaotic ones in the mathematical
sense;
  It is not required to choose which variables are important, the network does.
What  are  the  limitations  of
using SOM ?
  Evaluation of the map or
optimal  tuning  of  the
map remains important in
the  analysis  (number  of
clusters,  quality  and
stability  of  the  clusters,
validation,…).
  As  most  statistical
software, a SOM-map by
itself cannot be the final
outcome. Expertise input
and interpretation remain
of  utmost  importance,
otherwise  neural
networks  remain  very
much  a ‘black  box’
solution with a focus on
the input and the output.
  The production of a result
summary,  highlighting
the differences among the
clusters, is recommended.
Overall, the chapter is a visual exploration through the European banking
landscape, exploration that will raise a number of questions on cross-border
consolidation and provide an introduction and a guide to the discussion of the
M&A track record of European banking groups in chapter 4 and in the case
studies of chapter 5.
The main data source for the input data in the SOM-application has been the
FitchIBCA Bankscope  database
14.  In  order  to  define  our  sample  of  the
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Source: Bankscope, own calculations.
14 The use of Bankscope has two important advantages: (1) it provides a large number of
standardised ratios and accounting data which make international comparisons possible and (2) the
number of available accounting-based source data is substantially higher than in other sources.100 largest European banking groups, a number of criteria have been set
forward to limit the scope of banks included in the analysis: 
(1) country of origin: EU of 15, completed with Norway and Switzerland
(table 3.1);
(2) only the consolidated annual accounts are considered;
(3) elimination of subsidiaries of the selected European banking groups;
(4) ranking  according  to  total  assets  for  2000  (see  annex  1  for  the  key
statistics of the European top 100).
Several commercially developed software tools are available on the concept
and algorithm of SOM. In this paper, the input data have been translated by
Viscovery  SOMine
15 Standard  Edition  3.0  of  Eudaptics  GmbH  (Austria).
More details are given in annex 2. 
3.2 The panorama 2000 
For the panorama 2000 a set of variables has been selected and included in
the input data of the SOM software tool. Only those variables that were
considered meaningful in relation to the performance, efficiency and structure
of the various financial groups have been selected. In the initial data set,
a total of 65 ratios were available, out of which 18 have been considered
relevant to the analysis (table 3.2). A large number of important ratios have
not been included because another variable already captured them to a large
extent (based on a correlation analysis
16). The pre-processing of the variables
was undertaken as follows:
(1) The software tool offers the possibility of giving an additional weight to
various variables. For the analysis we have opted for total assets and
country code not being of any influence on the map creation (weight = 0).
However, the two variables remained available for the interpretation of
the map.
(2) In order to avoid a “trial-and-error” process, all other variables have been
given  an  equal  weight.  Obviously,  changing  the  variable  priority  (i.e.
changing the weights) may cause significant changes to the resulting map.
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15 “Viscovery is user-friendly, flexible and powerful. Viscovery builds a bridge between state-
of-the-art algorithm and the need for a user friendly, easy-to-use tool” (Software tools for Self-
Organizing Maps, G. Deboeck, 2000).
16 For example: total capital ratio (correlation coëfficient with tier 1 = 0.77), return on assets
(correlation coëfficient with ROE = 0.84), loan loss reserves/gross loans (correlation coëfficient
with non performing loans/gross loans = 0.89), recurring earning power (correlation coëfficient
with net interest margin = 0.78), …(3) All variables have been rebased on the basis of variance (i.e. divided by
their  standard  deviation)  and  transformed  applying  a sigmoid
transformation (i.e. to handle outliers without discarding them). 
(4) The number of each cluster has been adjusted according to the average
asset size of the clusters.
Table 3.2: The 18 input variables of the panorama 2000 
Criteria Variable Priority*
Asset quality  loan loss provisions / net interest revenue high
Asset quality non performing loans / gross loans high
Capital  Tier 1 high
Performance  net interest margin (NIM) high
Performance return on equity (ROE) high
Performance operational return on equity** high
Performance cost to income ratio (CTI) high
Performance productivity 
(total operating income / number of employees) high
Performance operational productivity 
(net operating income / number of employees)*** high
Income & cost structure  net interest revenue / total operating income high
Income & cost structure commission income / total operating income high
Income & cost structure trading income / total operating income high
Income & cost structure personnel expenses / overhead high
Liquidity  net loans / customer and short term funding high
Balance structure  customer loans / total assets high
Balance structure customer deposits / total assets high 
Other country code no priority
Other Total assets no priority
Source: Bankscope, own calculations 
* In the software tool, the priority factor gives additional weight to a variable. High equals a priority factor
of 1 (max.), no priority equals a priority factor of 0 (i.e. irrelevant for the analysis).
** net operating income (or profit before taxes excluding other income and loans loss provisions) / equity.
*** net operating income (total operating income – overheads) / number of employees.
The result is a photograph of the European landscape in 2000, regrouped in
7 clusters. Key cluster statistics are summarised in table 3.3 (based on the
cluster average). The name of the individual financial groups in the different
clusters and on the map are available in table 3.4. and figure 3.2. It should be
clear that the cluster in which an individual bank is positioned is not the only
important aspect. The proximity to the adjacent cluster also is.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sTable 3.4: The 7 Clusters
Cluster 1: Credit  Mutuel,  BNP Paribas,  GB
Populaires,  FORTIS,  Natexis  ,
Crédit  Lyonnais,  Société  Générale,
Crédit Agricole, ING , DGZ, Alpha
Bank, KBC, UBS, Deutsche Bank,
CIC, Credit Suisse
Cluster 2: Danske  Bank,  Bankgesellschaft
Berlin,  Deutsche  Postbank,  BP di
Lodi,  WestLB,  DG  BANK,  HVB,
Baden-W.  Bank,  BC  Vaudoise,
RZB,  Commerzbank,  Dresdner
Bank, CDC
Cluster 3: Rabobank,  BANCAJA,  NB  of
Greece,  Banco  de  Sabadell,  LA
CAIXA,  Caixa  Catalunya,  CB  of
Greece,  HSBC,  BBVA,  Caja
Madrid, Standard Chartered, Allied
Irish Banks, SCH, BPI – SGPS, Barclays, UniCredito, BP di Milano, SEB, San Paolo
IMI, ABN Amro, BP di Verona, Banca Lombarda, BP di Bergamo
Cluster 4: DePfa, Rentenbank, Bayerische LB, LB Sachsen, HELABA, LB Rheinland-Pfalz, LB
Baden-Wuerttemberg, NORD/LB, WGZ Bank
Cluster 5: BM dei Paschi di Siena, IntesaBci, Banca di Roma, BNL, Banca Antonveneta, BP di
Novara
Cluster 6: Halifax,  Northern  Rock,  Abbey  National,  BESCL,  Bankinter,  RBoS,  SNS  Reaal,
Okobank, Dexia, Lloyds TSB, Alliance & Leicester, DNB Group, Bank of Scotland, UB
of Norway, Swedbank, SV Raiffeisenbanken, Sampo Bank, Svenska Handelsbanken,
Rolo Banca 1473, Bank of Ireland, NORDEA, Jyske Bank, BC Português, BP Espanol,
Caixa G. de Depositos
Cluster 7: Mediobanca, IKB D. Industriebank, NIB, Nykredit, BHW
Source: Dexia Bank, own calculations
What do we learn from this panorama 2000?
  Despite  the  absence  of  a country  variable  in  processing  the  map,
nationalities do emerge. Italian, German and Nordic banks seem to be
concentrated (although sometimes across different clusters) within the map. 
  Despite the limited information on the strategic focus or country-specific
factors, niche banks and Landesbanken are concentrated in separate clusters
and treated appropriately in the analysis.
  Τ aking into account the data scope and limitations, the map clearly shows
that cluster 6 had (and likely still has) a competitive advantage in the
European landscape, with cluster 3 as a competitive runner-up. Clusters 1,
2 and 5 all have a cost management problem. Clusters 2, 4 and 5 are clearly
the most vulnerable if European competition intensifies.
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Remarkably, a separation line exists from the bottom-left corner to the upper-
right  one:  (i)  above  the  line,  mainly  Southern-European,  UK  and  Nordic
banks (i.e. clusters 3, 5 and 6) and (ii) below the line, mainly French, Benelux,
Swiss and German banks (i.e. clusters 1, 2, 4 and 7). Few exceptions can be
found on this line of fracture (excluding financial institutions close to this
line, Dexia remains the sole exception). Furthermore, overlooking all the
variables in the software tool, the net interest margin seems to be the single
most powerful variable to explain this distinction.
3.3 The panorama changes 1995–2000
In the panorama changes 1995–2000, we follow a more dynamic approach,
as we also include the annual changes between 1995 and 2000 in a number of
key variables (table 3.5: ROE, operational ROE, cost to income ratio, total
asset and net interest margin). The changes in these key variables function as
a proxy for the change in performance and efficiency of the top 100 European
financial institutions over the period in question.
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Figure 3.2.: The panorama 2000The pre-processing of the variables has been as follows:
(1) The software tool offers the possibility of giving an additional weight to
the different variables. As for the panorama 2000, we have opted for the
country code not being of any influence on the map creation (weight = 0).
However, the variable remained available for the interpretation of the
map. In contrast with the panorama 2000 analysis, total assets and the
change in total assets, as a proxy for growth, have been included in the
map creation.
(2) In order to avoid a “trial-and-error” process, all key variables have been
given an equal weight. The annual change between 1995–2000 in these
key  variables  (each  key  variable  is  represented  by  5  annual  change
variables)  is  given  a lower  priority.  The  only  reason  is  that  the  key
variables  are  considered  as  the  final  outcome  of  the  change  process
between 1995 and 2000 and should therefore not be overruled by the
annual  differences  of  the  key  variable  itself.  Obviously,  changing  the
variable priority (i.e. changing the weights) can cause significant changes
to the resulting map.
(3) All variables have been rebased on the basis of variance (i.e. divided by
their  standard  deviation)  and  transformed  applying  a sigmoid
transformation (i.e. to handle outliers without discarding them). 
(4) The number of each cluster has been adjusted according to the average
asset size of the clusters.
Table 3.5: The 32 input variables of the panorama 1995 – 2000
Criteria Variable Number of  Priority*
variables
Performance  total assets 2000 1 high
Performance  net interest margin 2000 1 high
Performance return on equity 2000 1 high
Performance operational return on equity* 2000 1 high
Performance cost to income ratio 2000 1 high
Performance change annual change in total assets 1995 – 2000 5  lower
Performance change annual change in total operating income 1995 – 2000 5 lower
Performance change annual change in return on equity 1995 – 2000 5  lower
Performance change annual change in operational return on equity 1995 – 2000 5 lower
Performance change annual change in cost to income ratio 1995 – 2000 5 lower
Performance change change in net interest margin 1995 – 2000 1 high
Other Country code 1 no priority
Source: Bankscope, own calculations.
* see table 3.2 (high =1, lower = 0.9, no priority = 0)















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sThe result is a dynamic picture of the European landscape between 1995 and
2000, regrouped in 8 clusters. Key cluster statistics are summarised in table
3.6  (based  on  the  cluster  average).  The  name  of  the  individual  financial
groups in the different clusters and on the map are mentioned in table 3.7. and
figure 3.3. As already mentioned for the panorama 2000, the cluster in which
an  individual  bank  is  positioned  is  not  the  only  important  aspect.  The
proximity to the adjacent cluster also is.
Source: Dexia Bank, own calculations.
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Table 3.7: The 8 Clusters
Cluster 1: UBS,  Deutsche  Bank,  Société
Générale,  Credit  Suisse,  ABN
Amro, BNP Paribas, Dexia, Crédit
Agricole,  Commerzbank,  Dresdner
Bank,  WestLB,  FORTIS,  DG
BANK, HVB
Cluster 2: NB of Greece, UniCredito, Lloyds
TSB,  CB  of  Greece,  Alliance  &
Leicester,  Barclays,  BP Espanol,
Bank of Scotland, Abbey National,
HSBC,  Halifax,  SCH,  GB
Populaires,  RZB,  BBVA,  Standard
Chartered, BPI – SGPS, KBC, San
Paolo IMI, CDC
Cluster 3: RBoS,  ING,  Alpha  Bank,  Danske
Bank, Rabobank, SNS Reaal, WGZ
Bank,  Caixa  Catalunya,  BHW,  LB
Rheinland-Pfalz, Mediobanca, DePfa, BRED
Cluster 4: DNB Group, NORDEA, Natexis
Cluster 5: LA CAIXA,  LB  Baden-Wuerttemberg,  SV Raiffeisenbanken,  Rentenbank,  Credit
Mutuel, Nykredit, BC Vaudoise, Crédit Lyonnais, IKB D. Industriebank, Bankinter, LB
Sachsen, Banca di Roma, Baden-W. Bank, BP di Novara, HELABA, Bankgesellschaft
Berlin, Sampo Bank, Deutsche Postbank, NORD/LB, Bayerische LB
Cluster 6: CIC, Svenska Handelsbanken, BP di Milano, Erste Bank, Swedbank, BNL, SEB
Cluster 7: UB of Norway, IntesaBci, BC Português, BESCL, Caixa G. de Depositos, Northern
Rock, DGZ, Okobank, Banca Lombarda, Cardine, NIB
Cluster 8: Banco de Sabadell, BP di Bergamo, Bank of Ireland, Caja Madrid, Allied Irish Banks,
BP di Lodi, Banca Antonveneta, BANCAJA, BP di Verona, BM dei Paschi di Siena,
Rolo Banca 1473, Jyske Bank
Clusters (flat) - Viscovery 1995-2000 final (empty)What do we learn from the panorama changes 1995–2000?
  To a lesser extent than in the panorama 2000, nationalities emerge. Again,
the fracture line is present (as it is in the panorama 2000) between, on the
one hand, mainly Southern-European, UK and Nordic banks and, on the
other hand, mainly French, Benelux, Swiss and German banks. 
  Since total assets and the change in total assets are included, as a proxy for
size and growth in the map creation, larger banks are concentrated on the
map. Still, the other variables remain active as cluster differentiators.
  Τ aking into account the scope and limitations of the data, the map clearly
shows the (domestic) competitive advantage built up by clusters 2, 4 and 7
within the European landscape over the period considered (1995–2000).
For cluster 1 (which includes mainly the large European players) and partly
cluster 3 (ING and RBOS), the cost and competition burden emerges again.
The efficiency and performance evolution of the financial institutions in
clusters 6, 8 and partly 3 makes them particularly vulnerable for a second
round of pan-European and European consolidation. For cluster 5 (which
mainly  contains  the  German  Landesbanken),  all  key  variables  are,  on
average, signalling that a strategy on performance and efficiency should be
high on the agenda and that action is required.
42 Panorama of the European banking groups
Figure 3.3: The panorama changes 1995–2000
Clusters (flat) - Viscovery 1995-2000 finalComparing  the  panorama  2000  with  the  panorama  changes  1995–2000
sometimes alters the interpretation of the strategic positioning of individual
banks. The former is a ‘photograph’ of the key variables of the individual
bank’s state in 2000 (balance structure, performance, asset quality, …). The
latter is a performance-growth overview of these individual banks over the
period 1995–2000. Based on the combination of both panoramas, four options
can be identified:
1. a favourable  positioning  in  2000  combined  with  a good  performance
evolution 1995–2000: a logical combination at first sight. From the data
analysis  it  emerges  that  a relative  high  net  interest  margin  has  been
a precondition for this combination (typical examples are the UK banks,
Scandinavian  banks  and  certain  Southern-European  banks).  However,
European integration, competition and consolidation are expected to erode
this factor. 
2. a favourable positioning in 2000 despite a weak performance evolution
1995–2000:  this  combination  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  these
individual banks had already a strong track record in the reference year
1995, making the performance report look bleak (typical examples are
Scandinavian banks and niche banks). A second option is that some banks
have  been  confronted  with  a M&A process,  which  again  makes  the
performance report 1995–2000 look rather bleak, without fundamentally
affecting the global outlook picture in 2000 (typical examples are Dexia
and RBoS).
3. a weak positioning in 2000 but a good performance evolution 1995–2000:
few banks fall under this combination, presumably because several banks
which could fall under this combination have been taken over or have
merged during their transformation from laggard to target. Remarkable is
that a number of banks are at the border of this combination, viz. banks
which  concentrate  mainly  on  banking  markets  outside  Europe.  These
banks show a relatively strong 1995–2000 track record, but score average
in the 2000 picture (examples are KBC, Unicredito, Standard Chartered,
Barclays, RZB, HSBC, SCH, BBVA). However, if the past track record
evolves in the same positive direction in the coming years, their strategy
may be an important asset in the European consolidation process.
4. a weak positioning in 2000 and a weak performance evolution 1995–2000:
again a logical combination in which often country-specific conditions
prevent the European consolidation process from playing its full role. As
these  country-specific  conditions  are  expected  to  erode  over  the  next
years, the vicious circle trend will have to be tackled rapidly (examples are
a number of Landesbanken or cooperative banks).
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possibly answer within the context of the present chapter, especially as far as
the positioning of individual banks is concerned.
However, when ‘reading’the two maps a number of elements should be taken
into account:
  Both  maps  are  complementary  and  should  therefore  be  treated
appropriately.  Nevertheless,  each  map  is  the  optimal  outcome  of  its
underlying variables. A clear understanding of these variables is therefore
of the utmost importance.
  Not only the membership of a specific cluster is important, but also the
proximity to the adjacent cluster is a significant factor (cfr supra).
  New financial data (for 2001), M&A activity, changes in country-specific
factors, etc. may alter the positioning of individual banks. Nevertheless the
overall pictures of the maps are judged to be quite robust. Acomparison of
the panorama 1999 with the panorama 2000 and of the panorama changes
1995–1999  with  the  panorama  changes  1995–2000  confirms  this
observation. Furthermore, banks do not switch from laggard to best practice
overnight (or vice versa).
  The maps mostly abstract from the various business lines of the individual
banks, except for those banks where the business lines have a significant
impact on the financial ratios. This should be taken into account when
comparing individual banks.
  Α s already stressed, the ultimate goal of the mapping is to provide a global
picture of the European banking landscape (represented by the European
top 100) and to raise number of questions on the domestic and cross-border
consolidation in the coming years. Who is ready to go beyond the domestic
market  (alone  or  with  a partner)? Who  are  the  efficient  home  market
players? Who can cope with a stand-alone strategy? Who is most likely to
go pan-European or even worldwide? Who will most likely undergo the
next domestic and cross-border wave? Who are the laggards and what is the
best practice on a European scale? To answer such questions, mapping
exercises only provide hints.
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4.1 Defining the reference groups
Most  research  focuses  on  a cross-country  comparison  when  looking  at
banking  efficiency  and  performance  or  compares  foreign-owned  and
domestically-owned banks in several countries. In the answer to the question
“who are Europe’s efficient bankers?”
17 a country ranking is presented in most
cases. Secondly, research papers often take a long and winding road before
being published. Consequently, the underlying data rarely take into account
the  M&A wave  of  the  late
90s. Thirdly, a review of the
literature on the value effects
of  bank  mergers  and
acquisitions suggests that no
broad  pattern  exists.  This
puts a case-by-case approach
in the spotlight.
The  M&A track  record  of
European banks described in
this chapter does not have all
the  necessary  technicalities
to be defined as fundamental
research.  Still,  it  has  the
merit of being relatively up-
to-date  (data  until  the  year
2000)  and  of  giving  some
further  clues  on  the  impact
of the M&A strategy and the
global  picture  (structure,
conduct and performance) of
three  reference  banking
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“…Domestic  banks  have  both  higher  cost
efficiency  and  higher  profit  efficiency  than
foreign banks operating in that country, a result
that is consistent with most of the findings in the
extant literature, where it has been interpreted as
supporting  the  home  field  advantage
hypothesis…Barriers  to  cross-border  operating
efficiency offset most of any potential efficiency
gains  from  cross-border  consolidation…These
results, should they continue to hold in the future,
suggest that the remaining barriers to efficient
cross-border consolidation may make it difficult
to achieve anything close to a continent-wide or




“…Adverse  (advantageous)  environmental
condition  could  be  a good  (bad)  competitive
factor for the home banking industry… but being
technically  efficient  and  having  increased
national  market  integration  seem  to  be  an
effective strategy to defer foreign competition…“
(Hasan, Lozano-Vita & Pastor, 2001)
17 Wagenvoort & Schure, EIB Papers, Volume 4, No. 1.
18 For disaggregated data, Berger makes the exception that “domestic banks may be more
efficient than foreign banks from most foreign countries, may be equally efficient from some
foreign countries, but may be less efficient than foreign banks from one (US) of the foreign
countries”. Focarelli & Pozzolo (2000) indicate that banks’ foreign investments are generally
directed towards markets where the banking sector is less efficient.groups.  The  three  reference  groups  are  defined  as:  (i)  banks  expanding
through  cross-border  M&A,  (ii)  banks  characterised  by  a significant  and
recent domestic M&A activity, (iii) banks which can be described as ‘steady-
state’banks, i.e. banks that have not been involved in a recent and significant
M&Adeal, implicitly leading to a lower growth rate of total assets. Further in
this paper, these three reference groups are used in the case studies of chapter
5 in order to compare the banks under discussion not only with the European
top 100, but also with banks that are assumed to have similar M&A paths.
Empirical evidence in the literature finds that, on average, foreign banks are
less efficient than domestic ones. This results from the fact that barriers to
cross-border operating efficiency offset most of any potential efficiency gains
from cross-border consolidation. These barriers are defined as difficulties of
managing and monitoring foreign branches, differences in language, culture,
currency and regulatory/supervisory structures and local competition policy
(cf. the discouraging factors, Chapter 1). 
Secondly, in-market consolidation tends to generate the largest cost savings in
headcount, branch reduction and system and operating costs. When looking at
the track record of European banking groups over the last 5 years, our first
hypothesis consequently  is  the  so-called  ‘home  field  advantage’ (Berger,
2000), namely that banks involved in domestic M&A should be, on average,
more efficient than banks involved in cross-border M&A.
Research also shows that efficient financial institutions tend to take over smaller,
less efficient ones and improve both cost and profit efficiency of the acquired
bank (defined as the so-called “wake up” of inefficient management). This
implies the assumption that efficient financial institutions spread their unique
expertise,  management  skills  and  operating  procedures  domestically  and
internationally. This results in our second hypothesis, viz. that domestic and
cross-border M&A activity should be more efficient than the so-called steady-
state financial institutions. Taking the hypothesis further, it would suggest that
inefficient steady-state banks have an increased profile as potential targets.
In  order  to  check  our  two  hypotheses  empirically,  on  the  base  of  the
1995–2000 data, the peer group of the 100 largest European banking groups
has been scaled down through a top-down approach (starting with Deutsche
Bank) to 29 banking groups. Asummary of the key information regarding the
selection process is presented in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, together with the
cluster number of the mapping analysis. It should be clear that sometimes the
complex M&A path of banks (combining domestic M&A and cross-border
46 M&A track record for European banking groupsM&A) offers no clear-cut differentiation between a domestic M&A bank and
a cross-border one.
The cross-border M&A reference group comprises 10 financial institutions
(table 4.1). These banks, often with a strong home market base, are mainly
characterised by a significant and recent cross-border merger or by an active
cross-border acquisition policy resulting in a strong international profile.
Table 4.1: The cross-border M&A group (10 financial institutions)
Name Cluster Cross-border M&A?
1995 – 2000
Deutsche Bank Cluster 1 62% of total assets outside home country 
UBS Cluster 1 57% of headcount outside home country 
HSBC Cluster 2 56% of total assets outside Europe 
ING Cluster 3 86% of insurance premium income outside home
country
46% of banking result outside home country
Crédit Suisse Cluster 1 65% of headcount outside home country 
ABN Amro Cluster 1 50% of headcount outside home country 
Barclays Cluster 2 31% of total assets outside home country 
FORTIS Cluster 1 Established in 1990, following the merger between
the Dutch combination AMEV/VSB and
Belgium’s largest insurer AG. In 1998, FORTIS
completes the merger with Generale Bank in
Belgium, which merges with ASLK-CGER. In 2000,
FORTIS absorbed Banque Générale du Luxembourg. 
Dexia Cluster 1 In 1996, Crédit Communal de Belgique (BE) and
Crédit Local de France (FR) merged to form the
Dexia group. In 2000 and 2001, Dexia absorbed
Artesia Banking Corporation (BE), Kempen (NL)
and Labouchère (NL).
NORDEA Cluster 1 Established in 1999 as a result of a cross-border
merger between MeritaNordbanken (SW/FI),
Unidanmark (DK) and Christiana Bank (NW). 
Source: Bankscope, Press reviews, bank websites
The  domestic  M&A reference  group comprises  11  financial  institutions
(table  4.2)  that  were  recently  subject  to  a large  domestic  M&A or  that
historically originated from a number of domestic M&A. This assumes that
the domestic M&A must have had a significant impact on the profile of the
group. The proximity in time of a significant domestic merger explains why
banks such as BNP Paribas, SCH and BBVA (despite their expansion outside
the home country) are included in this reference group. 
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Name Cluster Cross-border M&A?
1995 – 2000
HypoVereinsbank Cluster 1 Established in 1998 through the domestic merger
between Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank
AG and Bayerische Vereinsbank AG.
BNP Paribas Cluster 1 In 1993, BNP was privatised. In 1997, absorbed
Banque Nationale de Paris Norge A/S. In May 2000,
BNP absorbed BNP Finance and Paribas SA and
changed its name into BNP Paribas.
RB of Scotland Cluster 3 March 2000, acquisition of NatWest.
SCH Cluster 2 Established in 1999 as the result of the domestic
merger between Banco Santander SA and Banco
Central Hispanoamericano – BSCH. In 2001, it
changed its name to SCH.
BBVA Cluster 2 Established in 1988 following the domestic merger
of Banco de Bilbao and Banco de Vizcaya SA. On
January 1, 2000 absorbed Banca Catalana SA and
Argentaria, Caja Postal y Banco Hipotecario SA and
changed its name to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria – BBVA.
IntesaBci Cluster 7 Established in 1998 when Banco Ambrosiano Veneto
SpA and Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie
Lombarde SpA – CARIPLO transferred the banking
business to Banca Intesa. In 2000, absorbed
Mediocredito Lombardo SpA and in 2001 Banca
Commerciale Italiana SpA, COMIT and changed its
name to IntesaBci SpA.
Abbey National Cluster 2 Established in 1944, as The Abbey National Building
through the merger of Abbey Road Building Society
and The National Building Society. In 1996,
absorbed National & Provincial Building Society.
Lloyds TSB Cluster 2 Established in November 1995 as the result of the
merger between TSB and Lloyds Bank and later the
acquired Abbey Life and Cheltenham & Gloucester.
Unicredito Cluster 2 Established in 1998 through the domestic merger of
Credito Italiano and Unicredito SpA. In 1999,
UniCredito Italiano SpA absorbed Banca Popolare di
Rieti SpA.
KBC Cluster 2 Established in 1998 following the merger of
Kredietbank and Cera.
San Paolo IMI Cluster 2 Established in 1998, following the domestic merger
between Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino SpA
and Istituto Mobiliare Italiano SpA – IMI.
Source : Bankscope, Financial Press, Bank Websites
48 M&A track record for European banking groupsThe  steady-state  reference  group is  composed  of  8  financial  institutions
(table  4.3)  which  have  recently  not  been  involved  in  a cross-border  or
domestic M&A and/or whose total asset growth has been substantially lower
than  the  asset  growth  of  the  cross-border  and  domestic  M&A reference
groups.
Table 4.3: The steady-state group (8 financial institutions)
Total growth rate of total assets 




Crédit Agricole Cluster 1
Dresdner Cluster 1
Société Générale Cluster 1
Commerzbank Cluster 1
Westdeutsche LB Cluster 1
Rabobank Cluster 3
Crédit Lyonnais Cluster 5
Banca di Roma Cluster 5
Top 100 84.7%
Source: Bankscope
4.2 The track record
The analysis of the track record of the selected financial institutions has been
grafted  on  the  structure-conduct-performance  framework  (figure  4.1).
Furthermore, only bank accounting data have been used (source: Bankscope),
thus  making  abstraction  of  the  bank’s basic  and  environmental  conditions
which are not reflected in its accounting framework.
The  SCP framework  for  the  cross-border  M&A,  domestic  M&A and  the
steady state reference groups is presented in table 4.4. On average, clear
differences emerge between the three reference groups. The most important
elements are discussed below (figure 4.2 comparing the average ROE and the
average  cost  to  income  ratio  for  the  European  top  100  over  the  period
1995–2000).
M&A track record for European banking groups 49Figure 4.1: Revised Structure-Conduct-Performance framework for banking
markets
Source: D. Neuberger, 1997
Figure 4.2: The European top 100 compared on average ROE
(1995– 2000) and average CTI (1995–2000)
Source: Bankscope, own calculations
The domestic M&Areference group largely corresponds with cluster 2 of the
panorama changes 1995–2000. The average size of the banks included in this
group is comparable to the average size of the steady state group, but lower
than the cross-border group.
50 M&A track record for European banking groupsThe  most  eye-catching
differentiator for this group
is the cost to income ratio:
  banks from this reference
group  tend  to  have,  on
average,  a lower  cost  to
income ratio (61%), which
decreased significantly in
recent  years  (–1.3  per
year).  A simple
explanation  is  that  the
average annual growth in
overhead  costs  (+19.5%)
was, in contrast to the two
other  groups,  lower  than
the  average  annual
increase  in  operating
income (+21.0%);
  the  soundness,  the
balance sheet and income
structure  are  quite  comparable  with  the  European  top  100  average;
compared with the other two reference groups, there is a large focus on
interest income (53.8%) and a low dependence on trading income (7.4%).
Since  1995,  the  dependence  on  interest  income  has  been  decreasing
rapidly (share of interest income in total operating income decreasing by
3%  per  year)  in  favour  of  the  share  of  commission  income  in  total
operating income (+1.2% per year) and trading income (+1% per year);
  the groups rank amongst the best on profitability (average operational
ROE of 24.4% and ROA of 0.91% in 2000);
  the lower productivity (likely to be a result of the large domestic branch
network), compared to the cross-border M&A reference group and the
European  average,  is  largely  compensated  for  by  the  lower  share  of
personnel cost in the overhead;
  the group enjoys a substantial higher net interest margin (2.2%) compared
to all other categories (European average 1.83).
The Cross-border M&A reference group generally corresponds with cluster
1 of the panorama changes 1995–2000 (with exception of the two UK banks
and ING).
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“…increasingly it has looked as though the best
way  forward  for  financial  services  groups  in
Europe is through the creation of bancassurance
groups…such deals have been made necessary by
the growing power of bank distribution compared
with traditional sales forces… “
(Financial Times, 2001)
“… Key challenge is revenue growth….the cost
game is very limited in time as you can cut costs
once, but your revenue can grow into infinity, if
you get the right mix”
(CEO Abbey National, 2001)
“Costs  tend  to  creep  back  elsewhere  in  the
organisation…  optimisation-based  initiatives
have frequently tended to weaken organisations
functionally  rather  than  strengthen  them
financially”
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e54 M&A track record for European banking groups
The most striking element is the combination of a relatively high CTI with
a strong ROE (see also figure 4.1):
  the cost to income ratio (68.5%) is substantially higher than the European
average and came under pressure between 1995 and 2000, again a logical
result  of  the  fact  that  average  annual  growth  in  net  operating  income
(+18.6%)  has  been  lower  than  average  annual  growth  in  overhead
(+19.6%);
  the low and shrinking net interest margin (1.50) is largely compensated for
by the search for commission and fee income (34%) and trading income
(15%)  in  the  total  operating  income.  The  already  high  percentage  of
commission income makes its growth potential lower than the European
average (annual share increase of 0.6% in total operating income). The
growth in trading income in the share of total operating income was almost
two times higher than the European average;
  the balance structure on the asset side indicates a shift to short term liquid
financial  market  products  and  interbank  operations  (which  is  a low-
margin, but also a low-cost, business
19 );
  the major shift away from traditional intermediation in towards fee-based
activities superficially increased overall productivity but had a negative
impact  on  the  cost  control.  Corrected  for  overhead,  operational
productivity was almost comparable to the domestic M&A group.
As the search for other non-interest income will be maintained in the years to
come,  these  banks  will  likely  continue  to  expand  their  geographical
differentiation and diversification (cf. M&A activity of European banking
groups in the US, Latin America and Eastern Europe), as competition with the
efficient domestic strongholders is fierce. Also risk diversification and market
power will play a prominent role in the future M&A strategy.
Steady  state banks  seem  to  emerge  at  the  lower  end  of  the  spectrum  of
European banking efficiency:
  the cost to income ratio (74.1%), profitability (average ROE of 10.6% and
ROAof 0.4% in 2000) and productivity diverge substantially from the two
other reference groups and from the European average; 
  a large shift to commission income (share of 31.3% in total operating
income) and trading income (15.1%) cannot prevent the cost to income
ratio from still being at a non-competitive level;
19 Hurst, Perée & Fischback, EIB Papers, Volume 4, No 1, 1999M&A track record for European banking groups 55
  intense competition and consolidation seem to put the net interest margin
(1.26) under continued pressure;
  the need for risk coverage (loan loss provision divided by the net interest
margin) by the steady-state group is substantially higher. This indicates
that the risk is not being properly remunerated by margins, but it also has
a signalling function on the average credit quality of the asset base.
Following the literature which indicates that on average more efficient firms
acquire less efficient firms (Calomiris 1999, Rhoades 1998, Berger 1998), it
is likely that inefficient steady-state banks will not play a leading role in the
European consolidation process, unless as a potential target. In the course of
2001, several banks from this group were involved in acquisition deals/talks
or indicated that they are searching for a partner.
Because of the relatively limited number of observations, the results do not
permit statistically valid generalisation. They should therefore be interpreted
with caution, as they imply a number of caveats:
  recent  cross-border
M&A may  have  as
a disadvantage  that  the
efficiency  gains  emerge
only slowly. (cf. although
the FORTIS merger dates
from 1998, only recently
has surplus capacity been
tackled);
  the  full  impact  of  the
introduction  of  the  euro
has not yet been captured
by the data;
  new  technology  may
change  cross-border
delivery  channels  as  it
allows banks to side-step
regulations. But new technology also lowers the cost of obtaining and
processing information as well as allowing non-banks to provide banking
services;
  transfer  pricing  related  to  foreign  branches  and  capital  gains  from
shareholding and insurance activities may artificially improve the result
for the cross-border group;
“…The usual measure for bank efficiency is the
cost-to-  income  ratio…  Adverse  economic
conditions affect the cost to income ratio in the
sense that banks do not have total control over
their income streams whilst labour laws in many
continental  European  countries  hinder  staff
reductions and productivity improvement on the
cost side. In addition, M&A activity can add to
costs in the short term before all the efficiency
savings  or/and  increased  revenue  streams  are
worked  through.  In  addition  various  income
sources, such as those from trading activities are
also notoriously volatile. Thus, recent increase in
the cost to income ratio are just as likely to reflect
trends in earnings rather than costs…“
(Casu & Molyneux, 2000)  potential domestic M&A cost savings could be cannibalised by shrinking
interest  margins,  lower  fee  and  service  charges  as  a result  of  intense
competition;
  merger  success  or  failure  may  also  partly  be  determined,  as  the  SCP
framework suggests, by local regulatory and business factors.
56 M&A track record for European banking groups5  Case studies from the Benelux countries and Scandinavia
5.1 Four significant cases: ABN-AMRO, ING, FORTIS, NORDEA.
From the intense M&Aactivity, both domestic and cross-border, that occurred
in  the  Benelux  area  and  in  Scandinavia  in  the  Nineties,  finally  four  top
financial conglomerates have emerged: ING (Group and Bank, including the
Belgian BBL), ABN-AMRO, FORTIS (Group and Bank) and NORDEA.
The present chapter is devoted to a more detailed analysis of these cases. For
this analysis, we use the same conceptual and statistical framework as in the
analysis of the 100 top European banks
20. In the clustering exercise about the
track record of these banks, our four cases belong to the cluster of important
banks featured by cross-border M&A (see table 4.4).
In our opinion these cases are quite relevant for the overall analysis in our
study:
  They deal with important financial groups at the European and even at the
world level. In the bank ranking of The Banker for the year 2000, ABN-
AMRO and FORTIS are #1 in their own country and ING is #2; in the
European ranking they score respectively 8, 21 and 11 (ING Group) and
in  the  world  banking  ranking,  respectively  17,  39  and  24.  NORDEA,
although smaller (26
th in the European and 48
th in the world ranking) is in
banking #1 in Finland, #2 in Denmark and Norway, #2–3 in Sweden.
  Their banking experience is highly representative of the problems of big
banks  in  small  countries  with  mature  domestic  markets  (the big
banks/small country syndrome). As domestic consolidation goes on and
the average size of banks increases, more and more banks will have to face
that challenge, the more so because national and European authorities
have become more wary about domestic market dominance by some large
entities  (cf.  the  discussion  in  the  U.K.  about  the  planned  purchase  of
Abbey National by LloydsTSB).
  Comparing the four cases highlights diverging cross-border strategies:
– ABN-AMRO:  cross-border  activity  by  acquisitions  within  industry
(banking with emphasis on wholesale transactions: corporate finance,
capital market operations and asset management).
57
20 For this reason our figures, based on the Bankscope database, may show slight differences


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.– ING:  Cross-border  activity  mainly  by  acquisitions  cross-industry
(insurance/banks).
– FORTIS:  Cross-border  activity  through  mergers  cross-industry
(insurance/banks).
– NORDEA: a mixture of cross-border mergers and acquisitions within
and cross-industry (banks/insurance).
In this chapter, we first analyse each of the four cases separately from (i) the
historical background and more specifically their cross-border activity in the
Nineties and in the first years of the present decade, and (ii) their present
profile and their strategy for the near future, taking also in consideration the
2001 results. Afterwards, we make an attempt to draw conclusions and to
derive lessons from these cases by comparing and evaluating them, in the
light of prospective developments at the European level.
5.2 A closer look at ABN-AMRO
  Historical background and the developments up to the first years of the
present decade.
The present ABN-AMRO was formally set up in 1991 by the merger of ABN
Bank and AMRO Bank. However, as emphasised by De Leeuw (1996), both
components have been involved in a “continuous process of mergers and
acquisitions”, which spread over more than 300 years. After World War II the
main events have been (Abraham, 1998 and 1999):
  In 1964, the merger of the Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij (1824)
with  the  Twentsche  Bank  (1861)  to  constitute  the  Algemene  Bank
Nederland (ABN).
  Also in 1964, the merger of the Amsterdamsche Bank (1871) and the
Rotterdamsche Bank (1863) to become the AMRO Bank.
  As  mentioned  above,  in  1991,  the  merger  between AMRO  and ABN,
which took place after an unsuccessful attempt of AMRO to merge with
the #1 in Belgium: the Generale Bank.
According to J. Kalff, at that time Chief Executive of ABN-AMRO (interview
in Euromoney, 1997), the merger was “amarriage of necessity”. The dominant
idea was that the growth potential of a Dutch bank was rather limited by its
mature domestic market and that it had to be found outside the Netherlands. So,
the combined number of branches in the home country has been progressively
reduced by more than one half, from 1429 in 1992 to 703 at the end of 2001.
60 Case studies from the Benelux countries and ScandinaviaOn the international front, a strong worldwide penetration has been based on
autonomous  growth,  reinforced  by  cross-border  acquisitions  and  joint
ventures.
21
Up to the record year 2000, the ABN-AMRO strategy and developments can
be summarised as follows:
  As a matter of principle, no significant involvement in bancassurance,
  Universal  banking,  retail  and  wholesale,  with  a growing  emphasis  on
wholesale banking, particularly outside the ‘home markets’,
  Worldwide expansion, but with variable success. In Europe, ABN-AMRO
has not succeeded in acquiring significant market shares outside Italy. The
attempts  to  capture  a strong  position  in  France  (bid  for  CIC)  and  in
Belgium (Generale Bank) were complete failures. In the latter case (1998),
the failure of the ABN- AMRO bid, in spite of a favourable attitude of the
management of the Generale Bank, was due partly to the resistance of
Belgian financial and political circles against the quite undiplomatic and
Case studies from the Benelux countries and Scandinavia 61
21 The main transactions which have shaped the present profile of ABN-AMRO are:
• 1979: Acquisition by AMRO of the LaSalle Group, which is now the second banking group
in the Chicago area. This acquisition has been the starting point for building an ABN-
AMRO network in the US, mainly in the Midwest. This network has been substantially
strengthened by the 1997 acquisition of the Standard Federal Bancorporation, which owns
the  Standard  Federal  Bank  and  by  the  2000  acquisition  of  the  Michigan  National
Corporation. This bank, the largest savings bank in its state, has been merged with the
Standard Federal Bank. On the contrary, to partly finance this acquisition and that of the
Alleghany Investment bank, ABN-AMRO sold its European American Bank, mainly active
in the NewYork area, to Citibank (2001). 
• 1996: A joint venture with Rothschild for primary market equity business.
• Also in 1996, acquisition of an 8,76% stake in the Banca di Roma (#4 in Italy), which has
been progressively increased to 10.2 %. This penetration into Italy has been reinforced by
the 2001 acquisition of a stake, up to 13%, in Banca Antonveneta (#8). Previously ABN-
AMRO had contributed to finance the acquisition by Antonveneta of the Banca Nazionale
dell’Agricoltura and had engaged in a 50–50% joint venture with Antonveneta in the field
of asset management. This slow and careful penetration in Italy is expected to turn this
country  into  the  fourth  ‘home’ market  of ABN-AMRO,  after  the  Netherlands,  the  US
Midwest and Brazil.
• Late in 1998, acquisition of the Banco Real in Brazil, a transaction which provided ABN-
AMRO with 5% of the Brazilian retail banking market. In this way Brazil became the third
homemarket of ABN-AMRO.
• Early in 2001, acquisition of an important part of the activities of ING Barings in New York.
This proved to be a major mishap when in March 2002 ABN-AMRO decided to close its
activities on American domestic equities and on domestic M&A in the US.
• Meanwhile a network has been set up, with variable success, in the Asia/Pacific region
(purchase of the Bank of Asia in Thailand (1998) and of consumer banking interests in India,
Singapore and Taiwan (1999). But activities had to be scaled down in Japan, particularly in
the securities business. This restructuring met with considerable local protest.
• Other  disinvestments  have  been  planned  in  countries  outside  the  home  markets  with
unfavourable profits and weak prospects of acquiring a significant position and a significant
market share.aggressive “Anglo-Saxon” style of the ABN-AMRO intervention. Taught
by that experience, penetration into Italy proceeds more smoothly
22.
  Strong  Dutch  predominance  in  leadership  and  organisation,  even  after
employment and revenue from abroad had become larger than that of the
Netherlands division.
  Strong impact of leading persons, especially of the successive Presidents
(R.J.Nelissen,  P.J.Kalff  and  now,  in  a more  aggressive  style,
R.W.J.Groenink).  Differences  in  character  and  outlook  have  had
a significant impact on the overall ABN-AMRO policy.
Because  of  its  worldwide  consolidation  (including  volatile  markets  and
countries) and, even more, by its concentration on wholesale banking, ABN-
AMRO was badly hit by the 2000–2001 economic and financial downturn,
which was reinforced by the aftermath of the September 11 events. In October
2001, it had to issue a profit warning about the prospective 2001 results. The
effective results, published in February 2002, showed a reduction by 23.5%
of the operating profit before taxes and of 23.7% of net profit
23, mainly due to
huge provisioning for loan losses and rising expenses in a year of stagnating
revenues. A restructuring plan was set up in the Netherlands, with a cut of
6,250 jobs and, in order to reduce risks, the securitisation of about 30,000
loans, mainly to small and midsized Dutch businesses. Abroad, ABN-AMRO
is  withdrawing  from  about  11  countries  and  is  discontinuing  parts  of  its
operations (mainly retail) in a number of other countries. For the US, where
ABN-AMRO  is  the  largest  foreign  bank  according  to  total  assets,  it
announced,  in  March  2002,  a substantial  restructuring  of  its  wholesale
banking business: activity in US domestic cash equities and in US domestic
M&A is being closed, leading to a loss of approx. 550 jobs. 
  Present profile and strategy for the near future.
Table 5.1 highlights some of the typical features of ABN-AMRO in the record
year 2000, as compared with the average of the 100 top European banks and
with the average of the Cross-Border Group, which can be considered as
a peer group:
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22 On the occasion of the acquisition of a significant stake in Antonveneta (2001), J.M. De
Jong, Executive Director of ABN-AMRO, did not deny that they had learnt from the ‘Belgian
lesson’ and  that,  when  taking  steps  in  Italy,  they  care  to  have  the  assent  of  everybody  of
importance in the country, inclusive the Italian government.
23 Net profit excluding some extraordinary results.  Largest  Benelux  financial  enterprise  of  banking  stricto  sensu  in
employment (> 110,000) as well as total assets (543 bn. EUR) and equity
(19 bn. EUR),
  Average capital adequacy ratio (10.4%), similar to the average of the top
100 but lower than the peer group average,
  Credit-oriented institution: balance sheet structure characterised by much
higher proportion (59%) of customer loans in total assets than the peer
group and the top 100 average,
  Hence,  importance  of  intermediation:  higher  proportion  (52%)  of  net
interest revenue in total operating income than the peer group, but less
than the top 100 average. This is strengthened by a favourable net interest
margin (2%),
  Rapid growth (18% a year) of operating income in the period 1995–2000,
but even faster (19%) increase of overhead costs,
  Hence, unfavourable cost to income ratio (73%), even compared with the
high peer group average, which reflects a low productivity per employee,
  As a final result, lower Return on Equity (14.9%) than the peer group,
although similar to the 100 top average.
In view of this mixed position, a new strategy was designed in 2000 and was
initiated from January 1, 2001 onwards, under the strong impulse of the new
President  Groenink.  It  aimed  at  reducing,  if  not  eliminating,  universal
banking (doing everything everywhere) in favour of more focused activities,
mainly wholesale banking and asset management, which were deemed to
offer  brighter  prospects  in  the  light  of  the  new  governing  objective:
maximising shareholders’ value.
The existing semi-geographical, semi-functional organisation in four divisions
(The Netherlands, Foreign, Investment Banking, Resource Management) has
been replaced by a structure of three largely autonomous, customer-oriented
and globally-organised Strategic Business Units (Wholesale Clients, Consumer
& Commercial Clients, Private Clients & Asset Management). This strategy
was  set  up  in  a perspective  of  focused  profitable  growth,  organised  on
a worldwide basis, with a reinforced emphasis on wholesale, and accelerated
expansion in the home markets. In Europe, penetration by significant cross-
border mergers or acquisitions was even explicitly suggested.
The performance was to be measured by the total return to shareholders, as
compared to the corresponding value of a peer group of 20 competitors (see
table 5.2), the target for ABN-AMRO being to belong to the top 5 of this peer
group by the end of 2004.
Case studies from the Benelux countries and Scandinavia 63Table 5.2: The ABN-AMRO share and its peer group
12 June 2002 
Average of three months previous to 1 January 2001 = 100.
Source: ABN-AMRO website
Figure 5.1. ABN-AMRO peer group TRS tracker
(measured daily using a three months’ moving average)
Source: ABN-AMRO website
Unfortunately, this strategy had to be initiated in a climate, not of regular and
sustained growth but of US and worldwide recession, and of international
political instability after the September 11 events. The bad luck was that these
unfavourable developments just hit what the new strategy considered the most
promising  activities  and  markets:  wholesale  banking  and  home  markets
outside  the  Netherlands.  As  mentioned  above,  considerable  loan  loss
provisions had to be made. The index of the ABN-AMRO share, instead of
rising gradually to the top 5 of the peer group, did not only lag considerably
behind the top but, for several months after the September 11 events, also
behind the median of the peer group. It started to recover at the end of 2001.
However, from the second quarter 2002 on, the improvement first slowed down
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1 Barclays 126,2
2 BNP Paribas 125,2
3 Spcoete Generale 123,8
4 Bank One 121,1
5 Lloyda TSB 119,0
6 Wells Fargo 111,1








15 Deutsche Bank 82,7
16 Credit Suisse 76,0
17 ING 74,5
18 Merrill Lynch 73,9
19 Morgan Stanley 70,0
20 HypoVereinsbank 65,9
ABN AMRO (13) 87,0and  was  afterwards  stopped  by  deteriorating  business  and  stock  markets
conditions, culminating in the July-August stock exchange crisis.
In  these  conditions,  the  emphasis  had  to  be  shifted  to  cost  cutting,  to
compensate for the stagnation of revenue and for loan losses. This cost cutting
also had to be applied to activities, which resisted to the downturn much
better than the glamorous new strategy operations. Hence a climate of internal
uncertainty developed, which probably stimulated many staff members to
react  positively  to  the  opportunity  and  the  financial  incentives  of  the
programme of early voluntary retirement.
24
This experience shows how unexpected developments and events can impair
a long-term strategy that focuses too much on activities with an outspoken
cyclical profile. The trade-off between efficiency and stability also exists in this
field.  Mutual  compensation  between  activities  of  different  profile  and
profitability is unavoidable in difficult times and limits the alleged autonomy of
the various strategic units. It should even be deemed acomparative advantage of
a well-balanced  conglomerate  that  it  has  relatively  more  scope  for  such
compensations. No wonder that ABN-AMRO is actually softening its profile by
stressing asset gathering, among othersby cooperation between SBU Consumer
& Commercial Clients and SBU Private Clients & Asset Management.
All this has also to be applied to merger and acquisitions activity. At first
sight, the large and diversified base of a big financial institution allows it to
continue with such activity, even in difficult times, when new opportunities
may appear
25. However, this demands robustness and constancy of action. 
5.3A closer look at ING
  Historical  background  and  developments  up  to  the  first  years  of  the
present decade.
The ING Group also originates from a domestic merger. In 1991, shortly after
the regulatory interdiction of conglomeration between banks and insurance
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24 As announced on January 16 2002, the day after the expiration date for reacting, 6,673
persons expressed their intent to make use of this programme. This means that the targeted cut of
6,250 jobs will be most probably reached without major social difficulties. Additional recruitments
had to be organised temporarily to fill some vacancies. 
25 According to a rather cynical saying attributed to Ad Jacobs, former President of ING: one
has to shoot the birds when they are flying low’.companies had been lifted in the Netherlands, the leading insurance company
Nationale-Nederlanden and the NMB Postbank Group merged to become the
Internationale  Nederlanden  Groep  (ING).  Both  partners  were  themselves
products of previous mergers
26.
In a recent interview the present President of the Group (Ewald Kist, 2001)
recalled that the main rationale for this deal had been that the insurer had
substantial money but insufficient distribution channels, while the bank had
distribution facilities and many plans, including expansion abroad, but ... no
money. In that respect the merger was bancassurance from the outset: the
basic consensus was that the insurer’s money could and should be used for
expansion on a worldwide basis and not only for the small and mature Dutch
market.
In the Nineties, a worldwide expansion occurred, not only in industrialised
countries, but also in a number of emerging countries in Latin America, Asia
and Central Europe. Many acquisitions took place as an accelerating support
of autonomous growth.
27
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26 Nationale-Nederlanden  originated  in  1963  from  the  merger  between  the  Nationale
Levenverzekering-Bank (1863) and the insurance company De Nederlanden (1845). The NMB
Postbank Group originated in 1989 from the merger of the Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank,
which was primarily oriented towards small businesses and the Postbank, whose roots were in the
state postal and postcheque service. These origins from outside wholesale and corporate banking
– and quite different from ABN-AMRO’s – still have their impact on the tradition and the present
strategy of the ING Group.
27 Among the more important acquisitions one may list:
• 1995: acquisition of Barings Brothers and Co, the U.K. merchant bank, which had run into
difficulties after a trader’s scandal on its premises in Singapore. The acquisition by ING did
not put an end to Barings problems, with the ultimate result that the activities of Barings had
to be scaled down: in 2000 the US activities were sold and the remainder has been integrated
into the wholesale activities of ING Europe.
• 1997: after years of Belgian resistance, acquisition of Banque Bruxelles Lambert (BBL), the
#3 bank in Belgium, with a network of about 950 (now about 1000) branches in Belgium
and extensive international operations. By this acquisition Belgium has become the second
home  market  for  ING,  BBL keeping  its  legal  status,  its  own  brands  and  most  of  its
administrative organisation. As ING did not have an extensive network in Belgium before
the acquisition, no drastic reduction of the retail network had to be organised. From 2000
on, ING activities in the Netherlands and in Belgium have been integrated into ING Europe,
BBL heading the group of South Western Europe.
• 1999: acquisition of BHF-Bank in Germany.
• 2000: acquisition of the American insurance companies ReliaStar, Aetna Financial Services
and Aetna International. However, in France, the ING takeover bid for Credit Commercial
de France (CCF) was unsuccessful.
• 2001:  acquisition  of  the  Bank  Slaski in  Poland  and  of  the  Mexican  insurer  Seguros
Comercial America.As  a result  of  all  these  operations,  ING  has  evolved,  in  ten  years,  from
a domestic  bancassurance  scheme  into  an  international  financial  services
conglomerate, characterised by: 
  A combination of banking, insurance and asset management (“We are not
a bank!”, E. Kist, 2001),
  A rather loosely knit, but worldwide network, with accents differing from
one  region  to  another:  much  banking  in  Western  Europe,  much  (life)
insurance in the Americas etc,
  A ‘multi-national’ approach with much adjustment to local, regional and
national conditions, much responsibility entrusted to local directors, and
integration of foreign leading professionals in the top of the organisation,
  A multi-channel  approach:  bank  branches,  insurance  agents  and  also
successful Direct Banking,
  A strong involvement in ethical and societal issues; ING definitely holds
the stakeholders’ view in corporate governance,
  As a consequence of its presence in many emerging markets and of some
unfortunate episodes, such as Barings, some reputation of ‘appetite for
risk’. 
The 2000–2001 downturn also badly hit the ING Group, not only on the
banking but, unexpectedly, also on the insurance side, which used to be and
still is the stabilising component of the conglomerate. It was bad luck that the
recently acquired ReliaStar insurance company was rather heavily involved
in insurance and reassurance of risks related to the World Trade Center in
New York. The September 11 events led the ING Group to have about 600
million EUR of claims which will end up in an after tax loss of about 100
million EUR. In October 2001, a warning that the ambitious medium term
target of an increase of 12% a year in net profit per share would not be
reached  in  2001,  was  unfavourably  received  on  the  stock  markets.  The
effective results, published end February 2002 show a quasi-stabilisation of
the operational profit before taxation, insurance operations compensating, in
spite of the 11 September losses, for the decline in banking business. Yet the
overall  net  profit  fell  by  more  than  60%,  because  of  the  quasi-total
disappearance of net extraordinary results, which were considerable the year
before (cfr infra).
These  developments  have  intensified  the  need  for  streamlining  the
organisation  and  for  cutting  costs.  In  the  US  the  announced  programme
provides, besides non-salary cost cutting, a reduction of 1,600 job positions,
i.e. about 15% of the ING workforce in the US.
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In the record year 2000, as compared to the reference groups of the 100 top
European banks and of its peer group of the Cross-Border M&A Group, the
ING Group stood out as (see table 5.1):
  A typical financial services conglomerate with a lower (38%) customer
loans/total assets ratio and a much smaller proportion (30%) of net interest
revenue in total operating income. But in banking activity alone these
ratios do not differ much from those of ABN-AMRO, although the net
interest  margin  of  ING  (1%)  is  only  half  that  of  ABN-AMRO.  The
combination of banking and insurance accounts for the difference at the
Group level.
  An exceptionally fast grower as far as total assets are concerned (31%
a year in the period 1995–2000). This is presumably due to the importance
of acquisitions. Indeed, operating income growth (18% a year) was similar
to the average of the peer group and of ABN-AMRO.
  A high-cost conglomerate with much higher cost to income ratio (77%)
than in either reference group. This is even more evident in the specific
banking activity, also in Belgium (72% at BBL). 
  An excellent provider of return to shareholders (ROE of 37%), at least in
the record year 2000. This was due to capital gains by the sale of the CCF
stake and in the insurance activity. Indeed, the operational ROE is much
lower (14%) than in either reference group, especially in banking (but
except for BBL).
In  view  of  these  features  the  ING  strategy  and  organisation  have  been
reviewed in the beginning of the new millennium but before the September
11 events, and reoriented in the following directions:
  More  ambitious  profitability  targets:  an  operational  net  return  on
shareholders’ equity of at least 18% and an annual organic growth rate of
at least 12% of the net operational profit per share. Unfortunately, the
latter growth rate was impossible to reach in the year 2001 (effective
increase  of  5.3%). Additionally,  the  US  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission requested to book some unrealised losses on equities in the
income statement, which, according to US accounting standards, reduced
the 2001 profit by 630 million EUR. 
The improvement in the first months of 2002 allowed anticipating that the
first objective would be met for the full year, but that the second one won’t.
2002 results will be bolstered by the realisation of capital gains, e.g. the sale
of the (remaining) ING’s participation of 2.7% in FORTIS, which, rather
surprisingly, will be booked as ordinary operational profit. However, just as
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impact of deteriorating business and stock markets conditions.
  Streamlining: a search for more homogeneity and synergies: progressive
introduction of a worldwide ING brand instead of the once 100 different
brands in the Group, synergies in specific domains: integration of the
Dutch business units of the Group into one customer-focused organisation
with  four  divisions (retail,  wholesale,  intermediary  and  operations/IT),
centralisation  of  investment  management  (creation  of  ING  Investing
Management Europe), reorganisation of the regional structure into three
regions: ING Europe, ING Americas and ING Asia/Pacific; merger of
several subsidiaries operating in the same domain (e.g. the merger of all
subsidiaries of insurance in Belgium); last but not least, reduction and
rationalisation of several ICT centres and platforms.
  Cost cutting: besides the recent US reduction programme, cost cutting is
mainly pursued through disinvestments in non strategic and unprofitable
entities, particularly in the Third World, and in Europe through synergies
and regional restructuring.
For M&A activity, this reorientation puts less emphasis on acquisitions.
One observes a ‘digesting pause’but not a standstill of M&A. For example
in  January  2002,  ING  acquired  the  asset  management  activities  of
Deutsche  Bank  in  France.  Penetration  into  Latin  America  is  being
continued, despite the unstable political and economic situation in several
countries. Developments in 2002 include the acquisition of a 49% interest
in the Brazilian Insurance company Sul America and the acquisition of
a 19.2% stake in Banco Bital, a leading retail bank in Mexico. 
The overall experience of the ING Group is interesting in many respects:
  It highlights the complementary function of banking and insurance: its
virtues and its limits. Conventional wisdom says that banking provides the
driving force and the networks, whereas insurance brings the funds, the
long-term view, the embedded value and the stabilising force. The domestic
merger, which was the starting point of the worldwide expansion and of the
fast growth of the ING Group, was based on that conventional wisdom, and
on the whole it was successful (E. Kist in his 2001 interview
28). 
Eventually, banking and insurance remain two different métiers, which puts
a brake on integration and synergies. As FORTIS CEO Van Rossum put it
in his Message on the 2001 results of his Group: “Integration of the banking
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28 “Our merger has been ten years of ‘downs and up again’. The business cultures have
frequently clashed. Only the bottom line of all these ups and downs has been very decent.”and insurance activities is aHerculean task”.It is in life insurance that they
are really part of the same family. In other domains of insurance they are
subject to unexpected risks, which cannot be hedged on the basis of pure
actuarial analysis. As the aftermath of the September 11 events has shown
in the ING case, destabilising effects can also occur in insurance.
  It shows the vulnerability of fast growers to financial and environmental
accidents. This  fragility  exists  in  most  big  financial  institutions  but  it
increases when too many acquisitions, in too many domains, in too many
countries, weaken the control from top to bottom and prevent early and
decisive intervention when, somewhere in the worldwide organisation,
things are going wrong.
  It illustrates the dilemma which each conglomeration experiment has to face,
particularly when this consolidation occurs on a cross-border basis: The
conglomerate adjusts to local conditions, to national or local brands, which
is certainly customer-friendly, but puts a brake on homogenisation and
rationalisation, on economies of scale and scope and on synergies in general.
Or it centralises and decides to act worldwide or per region, as one single
homogeneous  entity,  which  increases  efficiency  and  lowers  unit  costs,
maybe at the price of less customer-friendliness, lower quality of service,
and lower motivation of local, regional or national professionals. The present
structure of the ING Group, more so than ABN-AMRO‘s, is a compromise
between  the  two  approaches:  three  regional  groups  (in  Europe,  with
subgroups) and one centralised asset management and private banking .
  Finally, ING shows how one of the most frequent flaws in cross-border
consolidations, particularly when the conglomerate is led and dominated
by  a ‘national  champion’,  can  be  reduced,  if  not  eliminated.  After
a M&A deal, directors and professionals from the periphery are often
transformed into mere subordinates, barely good enough to transmit and
execute the instructions and the orders of the head office. On the contrary,
the ING Group succeeds in providing enlarged career opportunities to
professionals from the periphery and has even opened the access to the top
of  the  conglomerate  to  foreign  (i.e.  non-Dutch)  nationals. At  BBL in
Belgium, there seem to be fewer complaints of demotivation than in other
acquired subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions in Belgium, and even
fewer than in the merger between equals in the FORTIS Group
29.
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29 In this respect, the 2000 and 2001 BBL reports were eloquent: they highlighted the enlarged
career opportunities offered by the integration of BBL in the ING worldwide organisation and (of
course) applauded the appointment of former BBL CEO, Michel Tilmant, as co-Chairman of ING
Europe and Vice President of the whole ING Group.5.4 A closer look at FORTIS
  Historical  background  and  developments  up  to  the  first  years  of  the
present decade.
As in the ING case and in the same period, the FORTIS Group started, in
1990, with a merger between a Dutch insurer, AMEV, and a Dutch bank,
VSB. However, the Belgian insurer AG joined the club very soon after. In this
way, the FORTIS conglomeration project stands out as an experiment, which
from the very beginning, had to face two challenges at the same time:
  The  challenge  of  a cross-border  Benelux  merger  between  equals,
combining at least two national cultures,
  The challenge of a merger, -not an acquisition where there is one company
which  takes  over  and  the  other  which  is  taken  over-,  cross-industry,
combining banking, insurance and related services, with their respective
business cultures.
For  a decade  and  up  to  December  2001,  the  strict  ‘bi-national’ and
‘egalitarian’ principle has remained the basic principle underlying the legal
structure, the corporate governance and much of the formal organisation of
the Group:
  Two listed companies, one in the Netherlands (FORTIS NL) and one in
Belgium  (FORTIS  B),  mutually  sharing,  on  a 50–50%  basis,  their
respective  equity,  but  represented  on  their  respective  exchanges,
Amsterdam  and  Brussels,  by  separate,  though  economically  linked,
shares,
  Two distinctive Boards, but, at the end of the period under review, with the
same composition,
  Two headquarters: Utrecht and Brussels,
  Two distinctive operating entities: FORTIS Bank, under Belgian law and
FORTIS Insurance under Dutch law,
  And  …four  main  supervising  authorities:  two  (banking  and  insurance
separately) in each country.
Even  in  this  intricate  framework,  internal  and  external  growth  has
materialised. It occurred mainly through autonomous growth, supported and
enlarged by basic strategic acquisitions in the Benelux countries and more
niche  acquisitions  outside,  both  followed  by  strenuous  integration  of  all
related entities and activities.
30
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FORTIS experience until recently, stand out quite clearly:
  The FORTIS Group has remained a conglomerate more limited in size and
geographical coverage than ABN-AMRO and ING. But it is more focused,
both geographically (Benelux area) and functionally (bancassurance).
  In the period under review it has mainly concentrated on overcoming the
limitations  of  two  separate  markets  of  small  countries,  by  acquiring
a strategic position in the whole Benelux area, by enlarging the concept of
the home market
31, and by trying to become the Benelux champion, or at
least  the  Benelux  reference. Whereas ABN-AMRO  and  (less  so)  ING
already had a strong domestic base before starting cross-border expansion,
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30 As far as M&A activity is concerned, the main transactions can be summarised as follows: 
• Banking in the Benelux area:
– 1993:  in  the  framework  of  the  privatisation  of  the  most  important  bancassurance
institution in Belgium, ASLK-CGER (Algemene Spaar- en Lijfrentekas- Caisse Générale
d’Epargne et de Retraite), acquisition of a controlling interest, followed by the acquisition
of the remainder in 1997 and 1999,
– 1995:  acquisition,  through ASLK-  CGER,  of  the  privatised  SNCI-NMKN  (Nationale
Maatschappij van Krediet aan de Nijverheid- Société Nationale de Crédit à l’Industrie),
– 1997: acquisition of the Dutch merchant bank MeesPierson,
– 1998: acquisition of the #1 bank in Belgium, the Generale Bank-Générale de Banque,
after a bitter contest of takeover bids with ABN-AMRO and in spite of the resistance of
the management of the Generale Bank (cf. supra for more details, Abraham 1998 and
1999),
– 1999–2000: merger of the five banks of the FORTIS Group and introduction of the single
denomination FORTIS Bank, replacing the own brands of Generale Bank, ASLK and
VSB.
• Insurance in the Benelux area:
– 1991: acquisition of the Dutch insurer Interlloyd,
– 2000: acquisition of ASR Verzekeringsgroep (Stad Rotterdam Verzekeringsgroep) and
merger between ASR and AMEV, to acquire a leading position in Dutch insurance.
• Main transactions outside the Benelux area:
– 1992: in Spain, joint venture with ‘La Caixa’and acquisition of an important stake in two
insurance subsidiaries of that joint venture: SegurCaixa (non-life) and VidaCaixa (life).
Penetration into Spain has been extended by the progressive acquisition of the bank Beta
Capital, which was completed in 2000,
– 1996–2001:  a series  of  acquisitions  but  also  disinvestments  of  insurance  interests  in
specific  market  segments  in  the  US  and  the  U.K.  (in  particular,  the  takeover  of  the
American Bankers Insurance Corporation (ABI), completed in 1999, and the merger of
this  insurance  company  with  the American  Security  Group  to  become Assurant,  the
biggest business unit of FORTIS in the US,
– 2001: penetration in Asia: A joint venture with Maybank in Malaysia, a life insurance
partnership  with  the  China  Insurance  Group  and  a strategic  alliance  with  Haitong
Securities in Shanghai.
31 In the introduction of the 2001 Report: Benelux, our home market…FORTIS had to build that base by a series of difficult acquisitions and
afterwards by much effort at integration and streamlining.
  Expansion outside the Benelux area has remained limited but well focused
as far as countries and activities are concerned: insurance in the US and
the UK, a mix of banking and insurance in selected countries of Western
Europe (Spain, France…).
  Throughout  the  whole  period,  FORTIS  has  remained  a ‘bi-national’
merger  between  equals,  with  the  permanent  concern  of  maintaining
equilibrium between the two partners. This equilibrium has been fostered
by the co-operation and the co-chairmanship of two outstanding leaders:
the Dutchman Hans Bartelds and the Belgian Maurice Lippens. As the
former retired from February 1 2002 on, the question rises whether the
merger-between-equals  principle  will  and  should  survive  its  initiators.
Already  now,  FORTIS  is  being  more  and  more  organised  and  run  as
a single  company  with  a single  CEO  (Anton  Van  Rossum),  a single
Executive Committee, and six businesses, set up on a functional cross-
border basis, except for insurance
32. 
Thanks to its concentration on Benelux, FORTIS has initially been hit less by
the US recession and the aftermath of the September 11 events. But it could
not escape the impact of the Enron disaster. In December 2001, the Group
announced that the target rate of at least 15% on ROE would be reached, also
for 2001, but that the increase in the net profit per share would be much lower
than the target rate of 12%. The effective results, published in March 2002,
show, accordingly to the announcement, a ROE of 17.9% but a decrease by
10% of the net profit per share. The operating result before taxation dropped
both in insurance (-6%) and in banking (-4%). Overall net profit diminished
by 6%.
The situation improved quite substantially in the first months of 2002. In the
first quarter net profit rose by 7%, as compared to the corresponding quarter
of 2001. This was mainly due to the banking business where integration and
restructuring efforts started to pay off. This induced the CEO to declare that
”barring unforeseen circumstances, FORTIS is expected to meet its financial
target of an increase in net operating profit per share of at least 12%…”. This
hope vanished in the wake of business and stock markets developments from
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32 The  six  businesses  are: Network  Banking,  Merchant  Banking,  Private  Banking  / Asset
Management, Insurance Belgium and International, Insurance Netherlands, Insurance United
States.Q2 2002 on. In July 2002, Fortis had to issue a profit warning mentioning that
“for the first time in FORTIS’history, the market value of the equity portfolio
has fallen below purchase value and unrealised losses had to be charged to
operation profit”. 
  Present profile and strategy for the near future.
Again we try to derive from the 2000 data in table 5.1 the profile of the
FORTIS Group as compared to the average of the 100 top European Banks,
to the peer group ‘Cross-border M&A’, but also to its immediate competitors
ABN-AMRO and ING:
  Although much smaller than ABN-AMRO and ING, FORTIS belongs in
our classification to the same peer group, but with significantly lower total
assets than the average of this peer group. Nevertheless, these total assets
are more than double the average of the 100 European Banks. It follows
that also the FORTIS experience has more than a regional significance.
  As with ING, FORTIS displays the typical profile of a financial services
conglomerate (banking, insurance, asset management and related services)
with a lower (38%, exactly the same as ING) customer loans/total assets
ratio than the peer group. But the proportion of net interest revenue in the
total operating income (47%) is higher than the average of the peer group
and  much  higher  than  in  the  ING  Group.  This  is  presumably  due  to
a higher importance of banking than in ING, which in turn reflects the
impact of the big bank takeovers in Belgium during the Nineties. It does
not seem a coincidence that many ratios of FORTIS  banking are quite
similar to those of BBL in the ING Group, which illustrates the general
banking  conditions  in  Belgium  (much  intermediation,  low  interest
margins) in the period under review.
  With  the  concentration  of  its  assets  and  its  activities  in  the  mature
economies of the Benelux area, FORTIS as a Group and particularly in
banking has, in the period 1995–2000, grown more slowly in total assets
(13% a year) and in operating income (idem) than its peer group and the
average of the 100 European top banks, and much more slowly than its
competitors ING and ABN-AMRO. But in contrast to these competitors,
the growth of overheads (12% a year, 6% in banking) has been slower than
that of operating income.
  In spite of a significant reduction in 1995–2000, the cost to income ratio
was still very high (75% in the Group, 66% in FORTIS banking). As with
its competitors, FORTIS was in 2000 a high-cost conglomerate, which is
an issue of major concern, the more so as growth is relatively slow. The
counterpart, however, is that its risk management is prudent and relatively
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interest  margin  ratio  (4.9%  for  the  Group,  7.2%  in  banking),  which
significantly declined in the 1995–2000 period.
  Finally, its ROE in 2000, both total (17%) and operational (18%) was
lower than its peer group and ING, but higher than that of ABN-AMRO
and the average of the 100 European top banks. 
Both  structure  and  strategy
were  under  review  in
2000–2001.  In  order  to
promote  the  image  of
FORTIS among the financial
investors  and  on  the  stock
markets  the  two  existing
FORTIS shares were unified
in  December  2001,  which
required  an  impressive  and
complex legal reshufflement,
wherein  the  duo  FORTIS
(NL)  and  FORTIS  (B)  has
disappeared,  to  be  replaced
by an even intricate dualistic
structure,  imposed  by
diverging corporate law and
taxation in the two countries
concerned (see the figure 5.2 which presents the new legal structure). This
could and should not be the end of the simplification and clarification process
of the formal structure of the Group.
The official FORTIS strategy for the near future, as announced at the end of
the year 2000, links up with current practice. It is far from revolutionary. It
puts autonomous growth as a priority and sketches different approaches for
three zones: the home market Benelux, Europe outside Benelux, the world
outside Europe.
For Benelux, it favours a customer-oriented approach on the one side and
internal  streamlining  (‘synergies’)  on  the  other.  For  FORTIS  Bank  the
streamlining aims at reducing the cost-income ratio from 65% in 2000 to 55%
at the end of 2003 by an accelerated downsizing of the network which, in
comparison with the late Nineties, will reduce the number of jobs by almost
4,000 and shrinking the number of branches from approximately 2380 (of
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Figure 5.2: The new legal structure of the
FORTIS Group as of 14.12.2001which 2110 in Belgium) at the end of 1998 to approximately 1520 (of which
approx. 1330 in Belgium) at the end of 2003.
33
A major event in the streamlining was, in September 2001, the migration to
a single network IT platform in a unique Big Bang weekend operation. 
In  Europe  outside  Benelux,  FORTIS  seeks  to  penetrate  into  promising
segments of banking and insurance, which would potentially contribute to
fostering  FORTIS  market  leadership  in  Europe. As  in  many  cross-border
business plans, private banking, asset management next to employee benefits
and bancassurance are quoted.
Outside Europe, FORTIS will continue to search for niches where it can
acquire a leading position. Existing participations, which do not correspond
to these criteria, have been or will be sold (e.g. FORTIS Australia in 2001).
The  basic  underlying  question  is  whether  this  programme  can  be
implemented by mere autonomous growth. Size has become a critical issue,
also for FORTIS. In this respect, the new CEO attracted widespread attention
when, in June 2001, he mentioned in an interview that in the next three years
the FORTIS Group had, for a merger between equals, to find a partner with
a strong presence in large markets in Europe, preferably Spain, France and
Germany. Afterwards, this intention has been repeated several times. Now,
however, its realisation seems to be made more dependent on better business
conditions  and  on  progress  in  internal  integration  and  restructuring  at
FORTIS itself.
5.5 A closer look at NORDEA
  Historical  background  and  developments  up  to  the  first  years  of  the
present decade: the Scandinavian banking crisis generates the Nordic
idea.
In  contrast  with  what  we  noticed  in  the  three  previous  cases,  where  the
driving force was the need to overcome the limitations of a national domestic
market  in  a perspective  of  growth,  the  formation  of  NORDEA was
indissolubly linked with crisis conditions, more specifically the Scandinavian
banking crisis of the early Nineties.
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33 At the end of March 2002, the network still comprised 2102 branches (of which 1880 in
Belgium), which means that much work has still to be done to reach the target. Driven  by  the  deregulation
of  the  financial  markets  in
the  ‘80s and  by  favourable
macroeconomic  develop-
ments,  a majority  of  the
Scandinavian banks took an
increased  risk  and  lending
profile to cope with the new
competitive  environment.
This  ultimately  resulted  in
a negative  outcome  and  an
extensive  banking  crisis  in  1991–1993.  Banks  in  Finland,  Norway  and
Sweden (to a lesser extent in Denmark) recorded substantial credit losses.
After large public support, issuing general guarantees and even bailing out
some of the banks, the banking industry in the Nordic region was bound to
restructure (Lindblom, 2001/Koskenkylä, 2001).
After  the  banking  crisis  in  the  Nordic  countries,  the  domestic  banking
concentration rocketed as it was marked by many banking M&As. Several
analysts argue that from this banking crisis and the consequent early necessity
for  a domestic  consolidation  process,  restructuring,  cost  cutting,  capacity
reductions and the introduction of new technologies, a competitive advantage
emerged for the Nordic banks. This process, combined with the fact that the
whole Nordic region was increasingly considered as the home market, more
than halved the number of banks in the Nordic countries from 1,513 in 1985
to 665 in 2000 (see table 5.3).
The formation of NORDEA
34,
a four-nation  universal  bank
and bankinsurer, has been the
exponent  of  this  rapid  and
successful  pace  of  domestic
and cross-border consolidation
(see  figure  5.4  for  a brief
history). The  idea  of  a pan-
Nordic  bank  was  ignited
by the  formation  of
MeritaNordbanken, a merger
between Merita (Finland) and
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Table 5.3: Number of banks in the Nordic
countries (1985 – 2000)
1985 2000 % change
Finland 654 347 -47%
Denmark 166 102 -39%
Norway 150 99 -34%
Sweden 543 117 -78%
Nordic countries 1513 665 -56%
Source: ECB (2000), Koskenkylä (2001)
“…the focus of the group has now switched to
integration  and  execution…  and  will  be
searching for signs of greater cost consistency
and  synergies  to  demonstrate  that  the  ‘Nordic
idea’really is a good idea… “
(Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, 2001)
“NORDEA shall have a cost efficiency ranking
among the best European listed financial services
companies. The objective for cost/income ratio in
banking has been sharpened and shall not exceed
50%.”
(NORDEA annual report, 2000)
34 Nordea stands for Nordic Ideas (annual report, 2000).Nordbanken (Sweden) in 1997. Nordbanken spanned over 170 years of Swedish
banking history and consisted of some 80 banks combined into one. Nordbanken
finished its consolidation process in 1993 with the acquisition of GotaBank. But
also merger partner Merita featured a large number of Finnish banking mergers,
by which small independent banks consolidated into a larger banking entity
leading to the creation of Merita in 1995. The MeritaNordbanken deal was formed
through  a so-called  ‘economic  merger’ that  was  based  on  equilibrium  in
ownership and management responsibilities. This initially resulted in a complex
group  structure,  which  took  the  form  of  a holding  company  (Nordic  Baltic
Holding, later renamed NORDEA). In the meantime, the Danish merger bank
Unidanmark gradually recovered from the 1992 crisis, which hit the entire Nordic
region. Only in 1999 did Unidanmark elaborate its activities towards a bank-
insurance group with the acquisition of the insurance companies Vesta (Norway)
and Try-Baltica (Denmark). The cross-border consolidation of, on the one side,
MeritaNordbanken  and,  on  the  other  side,  Unidanmark  (Denmark)  and  the
acquisition of Christiana Bank (Norway 2000) and of Postgirotbank (Sweden
2001) completed NORDEA’s supra-regional M&Astrategy in the Nordic region.
In a second phase, the group adopted a more simplified structure to streamline
managerial procedures and eliminate the effect of market inefficiencies on the
stock price (a similar simplified structure was also seen in cross-border banking
groups such as FORTIS and DEXIA). Simultaneously, the legal structure too has
been aligned with the business structure. The banking and insurance supervisors
in  all  four  Nordic  countries  have  agreed  on  a special  Memorandum  of
Understanding on the supervision of NORDEA and its banking and insurance
activities.
Figure 5.4: NORDEA’s domestic and cross-border M&A path
Source: NORDEA, Bankscope, Financial press
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can claim  that  they  have
captured a top market share
in  four  different  countries
(estimated  banking  market
share of 40% in Finland, 25%
in Denmark, 20% in Sweden
and  15%  in  Norway).
However, on aworldwide and
European  scale,  NORDEA
remains a relatively medium-
sized  bank  (ranking
approximately  at  the  48
th
position world-wide and the
26
th position  in  Europe,
according  to  The  Banker
classification). This relatively
limited  scale  at  a European
level  applies  to  all  Nordic
banking groups. When comparing for example the market capitalisation of the
Nordic  banks  with  the  Belgium/Netherlands  leading  banks  (see  also
chapter 4.1.), nearly all listed Nordic banks would almost fit into the market
value of ING (see figure 5.5). Although the size of the home markets is quite
comparable (26 million inhabitants in Belgium/Netherlands versus 24 million
inhabitants  in  the  Nordic  countries),  the  huge  difference  in  market
capitalisation can be explained by the cross-border, European or worldwide,
M&Aexpansion, outside the natural home market, of the Belgium/Netherlands
leading banks. Still, despite the absence of critical mass and consequently the
small  likelihood  that  NORDEA will  significantly  influence  the  European
banking landscape or the cross-border process, this case acquires its value due
to its early moves on cross-border consolidation and e-banking. On both tracks
and despite recent difficulties, NORDEAis a successful experiment, giving it
a unique positioning in the Nordic region and in European banking.
  Mapping confirms strategic track record.
In  the  panorama  and  track  record  analysis  (see  sections  3.2  and  4.1.)
NORDEA ranks amongst the best performing banking groups. In the 2000
panorama, most Nordic banks even form a specific cluster within a broader
European cluster (see figure 3.2 in chapter 3). Some cluster characteristics
are:
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Figure 5.5: Nordic and Benelux cases compared
(market capitalisation in Mio EUR, 31/12/01)
Source: Datastream  Panorama 2000:
Cluster 6; i.e. mid-sized banks, high capital ratio, high interest margin, top
return,  balanced  income  structure,  low  liquidity,  high  transformation
function,  high  efficiency  and  performance  and  top  asset  quality.  This
cluster  also  includes  other  Nordic  banking  groups:  Svenska  HB,
Swedbank, Sampo-Leonia, Den Norske Bank, Union Bank of Norway,
Jyske Bank and Okobank.
  Panorama changes 1995–2000:
Cluster 4; i.e. mid-sized banks characterised by rapid growth, average and
steady  interest  margin,  average  ROE  and  operational  ROE  (but  with
a strong improvement in recent years) and a low cost to income ratio
(which rapidly decreased in recent years). This cluster includes also Den
Norske Bank (i.e. Norway’s largest commercial bank and often cited as
“Norway’s financial champion”).
  SCP framework:
Within the cross-border M&A reference group, NORDEA clearly stands
out in several respects (see table 5.1):
  Structure: – size and capital ratios are very similar to the European
average peer group and, to a lesser extent, to the cross-
border M&A reference group;
– credit-oriented bank: with a balance sheet structure again
much more similar to the European top 100 average than
to the cross-border M&A peer group;
– strong focus on intermediation with a high proportion of
interest revenue in the total operating income (64%) and
a limited call on other income (trading income and other
income);
– a favourable net interest margin and low need for risk
coverage, both contribute to a consistent revenue flow.
  Conduct: the  merger  and  acquisition  path  of  NORDEA makes  an
historical comparison with its peer group quite difficult. Only
the  last  two  years  (1999  and  2000)  are  more  or  less
comparable  within  our  database.  Nevertheless,  the  latest
financial data show that the M&A integration process seems
to evolve successfully.
  Performance: although the balance sheet and income structure are more
comparable to the European top 100 average than to the
cross-border  peer  group,  both  the  performance  of  the
ROE  and  the  cost  to  income  ratio  are  situated  at  the
better end of the European spectrum.
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The organisational business structure of the group now includes four business
areas: retail banking, corporate & institutional banking, asset management &
life insurance, and finally general insurance. In the record year 2000, 60 % of
the  operating  profit  came  from  retail  banking,  20  %  from  corporate  and
institutional  banking,  8%  from  asset  management,  life  insurance  and
pensions,  2%  from  general  insurance,  the  remaining  10%  representing
primarily group treasury operations. In the difficult year 2001, when total
operating profit dropped by 21%, retail banking was resilient; its contribution
even rose to 89%.
Looking at the financial and business objectives one can only conclude that
they are comparable with objectives of other European banking groups (table
5.4). In the year 2000 most ratios complied with the targets, except the cost-
to-  income  relation.  In  2001  financial  results  were  unsatisfactory,  mainly
because  of  income  reduction  outside  retail  banking  and  increased  credit
losses. The cost- to income- ratio in banking rose from 55% to 58%, instead
of approaching the target of 50% set for 2004.
Table 5.4: NORDEA’s financial and business objectives
Ratio 2000 2001 Target
  Total shareholder return 46.5% - 19.8% in line with the best among 
European listed financial services
companies
  Return on equity 16.1% 13.8% ≥ Euro risk free rate + 8%
  Tier 1 capital ratio 6.8% 6.9% ≥ 6.5%
  Dividend payment 40% 44% ≥ 40% of net profit
  Cost to income ratio(banking) 55% 58% ≤ 50%
  Merger synergies (EURm) 23 168 annually 360
  Average loan losses and 0.08% 0,29% ≤ 0.4% of loans and guarantees
provisions
Source: NORDEAAnnual report, 2001 
One  particular  characteristic  of  the  Nordic  region  is  that  it  has  the
world’s largest  penetration  of  online  customer  services.  The  density  of
internet  users,  the  penetration  of  mobile  phones  and  the  combination  of
internet-mobile phone are by far the highest in the Nordic region, leaving both
the rest of Europe and the US behind. The early introduction of electronic and
automated  distribution  networks,  forced  by  the  banking  crisis,  has  led  to
a surge in the number of e-banking customers (actually estimated at more than
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number of log-ins in the world.
The broad and successful usage of e-services has resulted in a second year
running global award for “Best Online Business Strategy” (The Banker
35), in
addition to awards as the “Best Multi Channel Banking Team” (Banking
Technology) and “Best Internet Bank” (Euromoney).
Still, after years of restructuring, integration and focusing on new information
technologies, the branch network has not lost its importance (1245 branches
by the end of 2001)
36. Although e-banking has been growing rapidly in the
Nordic countries, it has not fully replaced the branch network. In recent years,
the (firmly reduced) branch network has recaptured its place in the cross-
selling banking strategy. In the NORDEAstrategy, branches are central in the
online  banking  strategy,  which  is  often  in  contrast  with  other  banking
examples. This implies that a multichannel approach (PC, phone, wap phone,
TV and  mobile  phones)  to  access  e-services,  combined  with  one  service
agreement  for  all  channels  is  integrated  into  the  branch-related  sales
activities. This strategy is based on the philosophy, again in contrast with
other European practices, that internet banking at NORDEA is not free
37.
As for the other banking groups in our case studies, the combination between
a merger integration process and a global economic slowdown weighted on
the income figures in 2001. Also in the Nordic region, priorities have clearly
switched to improving lending margins, monitoring credit losses and cutting
costs. The result is that even a well-positioned bank as NORDEAchanged its
focus, in line with other European banking groups, to cost cutting. Following
the  results  of  the  third  quarter  of  2001,  CEO  T.  Krarup  announced
“a substantial cost reduction programme until 2004 to achieve our ambitious
long term cost/income goal…”. Some disinvestments have also be decided
such as the resale of the general insurance unit Tryg to its former owner Tryg
i Denmark (June  2002),  the  proceeds  of  this  sale  contributing  to  finance
a buyback of about 5% of Nordea’s own shares.
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35 The Banker’s jury regards Nordea as the pathfinder in e-banking.
36 Nordea does not believe that internet banking as a separate business would be successful,
but only a combination between the use of technical development and the local bank officer is.
“We  are  not  taking  away  the  old  channels,  we  are  just  providing  more  choices”  (Head  of
e-banking).
37 “…we  believe  that  the  ones  who  are  using  it  should  pay  for  it,  and  not  the  other
customers…” (Head of e-banking).However the ambition to be among the best, if not the biggest, still remains.
As far as financial targets are concerned “NORDEA aims at creating value for
shareholders in the top five of the peer group of European listed financial
services  companies”  (Annual  Report  2001  p.25).  Very  dedicated  to
benchmarking, it distinguishes as peer groups (i) the Nordic peers, (ii) the
most comparable European banks and (iii) the group with significant capital
market exposure (table 5.5). 
Table 5.5: NORDEA’s peer group
Peer group
Nordic peers Most comparable European banks Capital markets exposure
Danske bank Abbey National ABN AMRO
Den norske Bank Alllied Irish Bank Barclays
Sampo Bank of Ireland BNP Paribas
SEB HBOS Dexia




Royal Bank of Scotland
Source: Annual Report 2001
The potential for further mergers and acquisitions in the region is quite limited.
Recent important merger initiatives such Sampo – Storebrand and SEB –
Swedbank were blocked by respectively the Norwegian authorities and the
European Commission, which could imply that the region’sconsolidation may
be close to its saturation point. This leads to the dilemma that further domestic
consolidation in the Nordic region will attract the attention of competition
authorities  while,  for  cross-border  acquisitions,  besides  the  traditionally
discouraging factors, Nordic banks also lack the necessary scale for aEuropean
breakthrough. In the course of 2001 only a few M&Adeals were recorded: viz
NORDEApurchase of Postgirot Bank (Sweden) for 0.45 billion EUR and Den
Norske Bank (Norway) purchase of Skandia Asset Management (Sweden) for
0.35  billion  EUR.  Still,  NORDEA’s proven  record  of  M&A success,  the
internet banking skills and the high efficiency rate should permit it to address
the growing scale of European financial services markets. The main remaining
dangers are the increasing price competition from small local players and
potential integration setbacks. As well as the fact that NORDEAis not the only
one to follow the Nordic path, and increasingly feels the competition pressure
from  Danske  Bank  (which  has  acquired  Real  Danmark),  Svenska
Handelsbanken, SEB, Swedbank and the merger Sampo-Leonia. 
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market, NORDEA primarily
seems  to  search  for
a strengthened  position  in
the  so-called  ‘emerging
home  market’ (Baltic  Sea
region and Poland). For the
future,  in  the  short  run,
NORDEA is not expected to
grow outside this Nordic and
emerging  home  market  as
the  burden  of  the
discouraging  M&A factors
is too high and its scale too small. At the same time, the high domestic
consolidation and the limited scope of the Nordic markets hamper, for the
time being, the penetration of large foreign players. 
However,  in  the  longer  run,  the  potential  for  one  large  pan-regional
M&A deal in the Nordic countries may still remain in place. 
5.6 A round-up: are these cases ‘unique’?
When comparing the four case studies in this chapter, one is struck by the
very fact that a common basic motivation of overcoming the constraints and
the  limitations  of  the  domestic  market  in  small  mature  economies,  has
induced such a diversity of (i) M&A formulas, (ii) financial institutions that
differ from each other by size, functional and geographical coverage and (iii)
‘life  stories’:  expected  and  unexpected  measures  and  developments,
accidents, successes, failures. This may suggest that each of these cases is
‘unique’ and therefore rather anecdotal and uninspiring, either for scientific
research or for decision- and policy-making. This is not our view. Without
denying obvious aspects of ‘uniqueness’, we think that this very diversity
contributes to clarifying at least five issues: 
  The impact of history:
Their origin clearly differentiates the three Benelux cases (ABN-AMRO,
ING,  FORTIS)  from  the  Scandinavian  one  (NORDEA).  The  former
originated  as  initiatives  to  overcome,  in  a perspective  of  growth,  the
limitations  of  the  national  domestic  market  in  small,  mature
and…overbanked  economies.  At  ABN-AMRO  and  ING,  less  so  at
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“…Despite  low  survival  rates  for  individual
foreign  banks  [in  the  Nordic  countries],  on
balance the foreign bank sector gained market
share over time,… but foreign banks bought entry
by accepting worse lending risks and owe much
to the acquisition of small local firms. [Overall]
the foreign bank sector has not carved out a large
role  in  any  of  the  four  Nordic  countries.  This
result is consistent with what we would expect for
mature, concentrated markets…“
(Engwall, Marquardt, Pedersen & Tschoegl,
2001)FORTIS,  cross-border  consolidation  occurred  after domestic  mergers,
which, at the same time, were exhausting the opportunities of expansion at
home  but  building  a solid  operational  and  financial  basis  for  ‘going
abroad’, and even for enlarging or duplicating the home market.
On the contrary, NORDEA has been formed after a banking crisis which
had forced Scandinavian banks into a drastic restructuring process, with
cost  cutting,  reductions  of  capacity,  mergers  and  introduction  of  new
technologies. The outcome has not only been a spectacular reduction of
the number of banks, but also the emergence of a competitive advantage
for Nordic banks. NORDEA can be seen as a formula for exploiting this
competitive edge on a four-country basis and for trying to become a pan-
Scandinavian  champion,  able  to  compete  successfully  in  all  the
Scandinavian countries and, in a limited way, on the international scene.
It follows, not only that developments of ABN-AMRO, ING and FORTIS
cannot be analysed without reference to the financial landscape of the
Benelux countries in the Nineties, the same applying to NORDEA with
reference  to  the  Scandinavian  landscape.  These  developments  are
themselves significant parts of the financial history of those countries and
illustrate many aspects of that history. In this respect, these cases are not
isolated,  ’unique’ ones,  but  throw  much  light  on  overall  financial
developments in North-Western Europe and in Scandinavia.
It is all the more interesting that, although referring to different origins and
different financial environments, these cases bring common issues to the
fore,  such  as  the  trade-off  between  fostering  the  domestic  base  or
promoting growth abroad, the issue of integrating, in an optimal way,
different components into one single organisation, the cost- to- income
relation  in  cross-border  activity,  etc.  This  also  reinforces  the
representativeness of our case studies. More issues of that kind will be
discussed in the following paragraphs.
  The specific nature of various M&A transactions: 
It is no coincidence that faster growth has been registered in cases where
M&A activity has been conducted on the basis of acquisitions (ABN-
AMRO and even more ING) than in the case of mergers among equals
(FORTIS). In the former case, the national and business culture of the
acquirer  predominates;  in  the  latter,  a balance  has  constantly  to  be
maintained and compromises have to be found between partners with their
own national and business culture.
This statement should, however, be qualified in two respects:
– The fast growth of ABN-AMRO and of ING had been preceded by
adomestic merger, which provided asolid base for fast expansion through
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created, on aprofitable basis, constraining expansion outside the Benelux
area. NORDEA, being a mixture of mergers and acquisitions seems to
stand midway between the two extremes. Its record is shorter but marked
by outspoken progress, followed by a more cautious approach. These
different  strategies  illustrate  the  respective  characteristics  of  ‘serial’
cross-border expansion after domestic consolidation and a‘simultaneous’
process, which includes, at the same time, domestic and cross-border
M&A activity. In our opinion, much depends on the specific conditions
and circumstances of the case: the competition among national rivals, the
policy and attitude of the authorities, etc.
– As already mentioned in the ING case, in cases of fast expansion by
means of cross-border acquisitions, an international conglomerate has to
strike  a precarious  balance  between  adjusting  to  local  conditions  in
various  countries,  which  is  usually  more  customer-friendly,  and
promoting centralisation, which usually increases efficiency and lowers
costs, frequently at the price of customer-friendliness. 
  Functional coverage:
The  main  distinction  here  is  between  conglomeration  and  focus.
Conglomeration, either domestic or cross-border, transforms a bank or an
insurance  company  into  a financial  services  institution  with  activities
beyond  its  original  purpose  (‘cross-industry’).  Focus,  on  the  contrary,
sharpens the original profile. Aconglomerate offers, within the institution,
a large array of channels and products to various groups of customers and,
internally, promotes synergies and compensations among activities with
a different economic and cyclical profile. Functional focus favours the
glamour of professional expertise.
In our four cases, in the period under review, the factual experience has not
been as sharp as the theoretical distinction suggests. ABN-AMRO, which
stresses  its  own  specific  banking  profile,  has  started  its  international
expansion  as  a universal  bank,  which  it  still  is  in  its  home  markets,
particularly in the Netherlands. In such a context, there remains scope for
compensation  between  activities  with  different  cyclical  profile  and
profitability. ABN-AMRO has sharpened its profile as a wholesale and
corporate banker, a business line with more cyclical variability, but seems
already  to  soften  or,  at  least,  to  qualify  this  position  by  favouring
cooperation between its various business units. Asset gathering now seems
high on the much fluctuating strategic agenda of ABN-AMRO. 
On the other hand, ING and FORTIS follow the conglomeration path,
mainly  through  bancassurance.  In  fact,  however,  in  countries  such  as
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and  in  the  US.  This  is  not  to  deny,  but  to  qualify  the  general
complementarity of banking and (life) insurance. Anyway, the existence of
an important insurance component contributes to financing the expansion
and promotes the long-term view in these conglomerates, the aftermath of
the September 11 events being the exception that should not impair the
rule, at least as long as the insurer acts as an insurer and not as an asset
manager relying (too much) on equities.
NORDEA seems to be such an exception. Although NORDEA represents
35% of life insurance in Finland, 10% in Denmark and 6% in Sweden,
together with 22% of General Insurance in Denmark and 19% in Norway,
the contribution of insurance activities to the overall operating profit is
minimal,  if  not  negative.  This  explains  the  present  predominance  of
banking, and particularly of retail banking, in the activities and the overall
results of the NORDEA Group, and also the planned disinvestments of
general  insurance,  which  is  at  the  same  time  the  most  distant  from
NORDEA’s core business and one of the least profitable activities.
  Geographical coverage:
Obviously,  the  main  feature  is  the  contrast  between  the  worldwide
approach of ABN-AMRO and ING, on the one hand, and the Benelux-
centred policy of FORTIS and the Nordic-oriented policy of NORDEAon
the other one. As mentioned above, this difference derives from the pre-
existing home base in the first two cases and the imperative to build one –
a Benelux one or a Scandinavian one – in the last two ones.
Some other features should not be neglected:
– In  all  Benelux  cases,  a significant  presence  in  the  US  has  been
considered an indispensable pillar of the institution. ABN-AMRO has
turned the US Midwest into its second most important ‘home’ market.
NORDEA seems to be less explicit in this respect. 
– In  none  of  the  Benelux  cases,  has  high  priority  been  given  to  an
expansion  in  Central,  Baltic  and  Eastern  Europe,  although  ING
represents almost 5% of the regional market share in Central and Eastern
Europe. German and Austrian banks but also the Belgian KBC and the
Italian Unicredito are relatively much more active in this area (see table
2.4). On the contrary, NORDEAconsiders the Baltic Region and Poland
as its emerging home market.
Finally,  it  should  be  noticed  that,  besides  the  basic  orientations,  the
geographical coverage in each of the cases has been influenced and even
determined by specific factors and events. If, in 1998, ABN-AMRO and not
FORTIS,  had  won  the  takeover-bid  contest  for  the  Generale  Bank  in
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from where penetration into Southern Europe would have been launched
and managed. In this respect, its actual slow penetration in Italy may be
considered a late and partial substitute for the 1998 failure. Likewise the
developments  in  FORTIS  would  have  been  different.  The  Belgian
component in assets, employment, revenue and policy would have been
much smaller. Good or bad luck remains asignificant factor in financial life.
  Policy and performance:
Although the domestic branch network has been substantially reduced at
ABN-AMRO, market share and market power in various countries outside
the Netherlands seem to have been, overall, more important motives than
short-term profitability, rationalisation and cost-cutting at ING and, less
so,  at  ABN-AMRO.  However,  in  the  less  glamorous  economic  and
financial climate of the first years of the present decade and in view of the
unfavourable  cost  to  income  ratio,  policy  attention  has  gradually,  but
surely, shifted towards more immediate profitability, which explains the
present ‘streamlining’ drive. At ABN-AMRO this profitability aspect has
even been integrated within an overall objective of increasing shareholders
value. In FORTIS, rationalisation and cost cutting were central from the
outset,  because  several  acquired  banks,  especially  in  Belgium,  had
overlapping networks of branches and redundant supporting services. This
situation will continue to have a strong impact on the overall policy of
FORTIS, certainly until the end of 2003, when the present multi-year
programme  is  due  to  be  completely  implemented.  At  NORDEA,  the
aftermath of the Scandinavian bank crisis and the introduction of new
technologies made for a start of the new conglomerate at a much more
favourable cost to income ratio than in the Benelux cases. This advantage
has  been  progressively  eroded  by  the  integration  of  newly  acquired
components  and  even  more  so  in  the  2001  developments  with  their
stagnation of income, their credit losses and their still increasing expenses. 
The striking feature in all four cases is that, at present, although coming from
different  origins,  motivations  and  policies,  they  all  converge  on  the
imperative of improving their cost to income ratio. Will these developments
put a permanent brake on the M&Aactivity of the four institutions? Probably
not, because the three Benelux institutions are involved in a leadership contest
in Europe and because all four institutions we studied, work intensely to
assert their presence among the top European banks and conglomerates by
policy and performance, if not by size.
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6.1 Our contribution to the debate
In chapter 1 we stated that the basic issue to be discussed was not whether or
when a new cross-border financial consolidation will occur, but how it will
occur. In this concluding chapter we try to gather some elements of response
to that question.
Our analysis was based on the belief, which was also our main hypothesis,
that in the present decade, the Pan-European landscape of the financial sector
in Europe will be determined by what is happening or will happen in a limited
number of banks. Our sample comprised the 100 largest banks in Europe and
was  supposed  to  be  composed  of  subgroups  with  similar  characteristics,
which could be discovered and quantified by statistical analysis, for which we
used the clustering technique.
The clusters helped identify peer groups. We were, of course, particularly
interested in the cases where banks, as the main banks in the Benelux area and
in Scandinavia in the Nineties, wanted to overcome the constraints of their
home market and to play an international role. In these cases, the peer group
becomes an international group engaged in cross-border autonomous growth,
which is usually supported by cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
This approach has been implemented in a series of steps from ‘top to bottom’,
using the same conceptual and statistical framework.
Having conducted this detailed theoretical and empirical analysis, one should
ask what does emerge from this work.
  The  clusters  in  the  panorama  2000  and,  to  a certain  degree,  in  the
panorama  changes  1995–2000,  feature  at  the  same  time  national  and
comparative advantage aspects: in the cluster of high efficiency, British
and Nordic Banks predominate. In the cluster of most vulnerable banks,
German and some Italian banks are prominent. In the clusters with large
international players, the cost and competition burden emerges. However,
this  profile  is  subject  to  change,  as  suggested  by  some  results  in  the
panorama changes 1995–2000.
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preliminary hints on the domestic and cross-border consolidation in the
coming years. Who is ready to go beyond the domestic market, alone or
with a partner? Who are the efficient home market players? Who can cope
with a stand-alone strategy? Who is most likely to go pan-European or
even worldwide? Who will most likely undergo the next domestic and
cross-border wave? Who are the laggards and what are the best practices
on a European scale?
  In the track record analysis, the most eye-catching differentiator in the
domestic  M&A reference  group  (11 banking  groups)  was  the  cost  to
income ratio (CTI) which was, on the average, lower than in the other
groups and which also decreased significantly in recent years. For the
cross-border  M&A Reference  Group  (10  banking  groups),  the  most
striking  element  was  the  combination  of  a relatively  high  CTI  with
a strong Return on Equity (ROE), which reflects the major shift in this
group from traditional intermediation in favour of fee-based activities.
This shift superficially increased productivity, but had a negative impact
on cost control. The steady-state banks (8 banking groups) seemed to
emerge at the lower end of the spectrum of European banking efficiency.
  In the comparison of the three Benelux cases and the Scandinavian one,
the striking aspect was that a common basic motivation of overcoming the
constraints and the limitations of the domestic market in small mature
economies, has induced a wide diversity of M&A formulas, of financial
institutions that differ from each other by size, functional and geographical
coverage, of very different life stories, expected and unexpected measures
and developments, accidents, successes, failures. This does not preclude
some generalisations.
Faster growth was registered where M&Aactivity had been conducted on the
basis of acquisitions (ABN-AMRO and even more ING) than in the case of
merger among equals (FORTIS).
Conglomeration  (ING  and  FORTIS)  transforms  a bank  or  an  insurance
company  into  a financial  services  institution  with  activities  beyond  its
original purpose, offering a large array of channels and products to various
groups of customers. Focus, such as in ABN-AMRO, favours the glamour of
professional expertise by sharpening the original profile.
Geographically, ABN-AMRO and ING chose a worldwide strategy while
FORTIS  remained  more  Benelux-centred  and  NORDEA Scandinavia-
centred. But in all Benelux cases a significant presence in the US has been
90 Concluding the study: a tentative response to the basic issuedeemed to be an indispensable pillar of the institution. At the other extreme,
in none of these three cases has high priority been given to an expansion in
Central and Eastern Europe while, on the contrary, NORDEA is building an
emerging home market in the Baltic region and in Poland.
In the beginning, market share and market power in various countries outside
the Netherlands seem to have been more important motives than short term
profitability, rationalisation and cost cutting, at ING and less at ABN-AMRO.
In the last two years, however, the less glamorous economic and financial
climate  forced  both  groups  into  intensive  streamlining  and  cost  cutting.
FORTIS had to face this problem from the outset, because of overlapping
networks  of  branches  and  redundant  supporting  services.  Finally,  in  the
aftermath of the Scandinavian banking crisis, NORDEA started with a very
competitive cost-to-income structure which was (partly) eroded afterwards,
compelling it to resort to the same streamlining and cost cutting as the three
other ones. General convergence in streamlining and cost cutting is certainly
the most striking feature of the present situation.
The overall impression is that cross-border M&A activity strongly stimulates
growth in assets and market shares but that revenue enhancement is slower
to materialise than expected in many business plans, while the cost increase
has frequently been understated. This seems to be less the case in domestic
M&A,  where  rationalisation  and  cost  cutting  are  mostly  high  on  the
immediate  agenda.  However,  the  case  studies  show  the  diversity  of  size,
structure and performance which may develop, even when the projects start
from a common motivation of overcoming the limitations of the domestic
market.
6.2 Looking ahead
At the closing date of the present study, all 100 top European banks have
published their results for the year 2001, be it in a not always harmonised
way. The banks included in our case studies have already done so in February-
March. In general, these results were unsatisfactory, in some cases even very
bad. Nevertheless, we believe that they will not invert the fundamental trend
towards  cross-border  consolidation  in  the  European  financial  sector.  As
stressed by CEO Van Rossum (see box), cyclical business conditions and the
search for consolidation synergies are two different things. But the strength of
the recessionary forces may of course, have an impact on the timing and on
some other aspects of the second M&A wave. If, for a long time, banks have
Concluding the study: a tentative response to the basic issue 91to compensate a fall in revenue and huge credit losses by ‘living on their
(hidden) reserves’, they lose ammunition for consolidation deals. Even worse,
very bad results can transform a potential acquirer into a target and start
a ‘survival  of  the  fittest’ process. When  some  birds  are  flying  low,  they
become new shooting targets for robust hunters. The survival of the fittest
hypothesis is, in present conditions, even after the stock markets crisis of
July-August 2002, not the most plausible or probable one. It remains a worst-
case hypothesis, which may alter the timing and the climate, but not the
occurrence of the consolidation wave. 
Our  main  interest  still
concerns  the  way  in  which
this  next  wave  will  occur:
in short,  evolution  or
revolution?
It is quite easy to elaborate
two scenarios on the basis of
that  distinction  and  to  list
under  each  of  them  their
main  determinants  and
aspects.
In  the  ‘evolution’ scenario,
cross- border M&A activity
remains an enlargement and
a complement  of  the
domestic market activity but
with an increasing weight of
cross-border  deals,  when
large  banks  become  more
sensitive to the limitations of
their home market, even in
the  large  European
countries.  Europe  gradually
and  partly  becomes  the
enlarged home market of the
national champions and their
challengers.  The  European  market  place  remains  a mosaic  of  national
clusters, be it with growing interdependence through competition.
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“…In a declining cycle you must, as a matter of
fact, sail a bit closer to the wind. But cyclical
business  conditions  and  the  search  for
consolidation  synergies  are  two  different
things…”
(Anton  Van  Rossum,  CEO  of  FORTIS,  in
a January  2002  interview,  published  in  Revue
Bancaire et Financière/Bank- en Financiewezen
Brussels, March-April 2002, our translation from
Dutch).
“...The impulse behind the mergers – the advent
of the euro, the move towards a single market in
financial  services  in  the  European  Union  and
flattening growth in domestic markets – will not
go  away.  Unquantifiable  factors,  such  as  the
chemistry  between  the  heads  of  financial
institutions, are also set to play a major role. In
this case, it could be the clincher….”
(The Banker, June 2001)
“..The  financial  sector  is  not  quietly  rippling
water. On the contrary, it is very tough business.
If you want to be pro-active in the consolidation
game, you must fix at this time which way to go
when choices are to be made. You should know
now,  whether  you  jump  on  the  train  or  not.
Otherwise, it is too late…”
(Anton van Rossum, same interview)The following factors and aspects fit into this scenario:
– The  present  structure  of  the  European  market  place,  as  shown  by  the
convergence  of  national  and  competitive  advantage  aspects  in  the
clustering exercise of chapter 3.
– The present strong emphasis on rationalisation and cost cutting, which
favours a home market approach. This is only progressively extended by
‘going abroad’, because much is still to be done on the original domestic
market  to  reduce  the  branch  networks  and  the  redundant  supporting
services (see chapter 4 and 5).
– The  still  existing  cultural  differences  and  legal  and  regulatory
impediments inhibiting cross-border deals, as revealed by the Lamfalussy
Report and the slow pace at which its recommendations are implemented
(see also chapter 1).
– The  impact  of  the  countervailing  power  of  national  and  regional
authorities, of vested business interests and of trade unions, against a fast
penetration of foreign interests (see chapter 2).
– The very nature of M&A deals, where “it takes two to tango” (Maurice
Lippens,  co-President  of  FORTIS),  the  (would-be)  partners  having
different interests, and different national and business cultures (see the
numerous recent failures of M&A negotiations, particularly when they
involve large banks, chapter 2).
In  the  ‘revolution’ hypothesis,  the  European  market  place  is  no  longer
a mosaic of enlarged national home markets, where foreigners can penetrate
only gradually, but a playing field on its own, where a selected international
group of peer institutions compete in size and market power. This competition
may  induce  a series  of  big  bangs  of  consolidation,  which  would  also
transform  the  national  settings.  Under  this  scenario  we  can  classify  the
following factors and aspects:
– a radical change in business expectations in the context of a new economic
boom in Europe;
– a new successful stage in European integration (a new Maastricht);
– strong  implementation  of  competition  rules  by  national  and  European
authorities, against quasi-monopolistic dominance of relevant national and
international markets;
– empire building by some banking groups, followed by rational herding
among the competitors (let’s jump on the train before it is too late, see
box);
– new  opportunities  for  robust  hunters  to  acquire  low  flying  birds  (cf.
supra);
– personal hubris of some Big Brothers (see chapter 1).
Concluding the study: a tentative response to the basic issue 93In our opinion, scenario 1 is by far the most realistic and most probable one,
because it fits the existing framework of the European financial sector and
European environmental conditions. In this respect, we also attribute much
weight to the fact that, on average, the banks of the domestic M&AReference
Group  are  in  better  shape  to  enter  the  European  market  place  than  their
colleagues of the Cross-Border Reference Group. It seems improbable that
they  will  use  the  comparative  advantage  gained  by  their  efforts  on  their
original home market to revolutionise the European market place, where they
are just entering the international peer group. Another consideration is that,
even if the motive of being big enough on the European market place is
a strong one, particularly as soon as the U.K. joins Euroland, other areas for
expansion abroad also exist (cf. the presence in the US of our three Benelux
cases in Chapter 5, the penetration of medium-sized Western European banks
in Central and Eastern Europe, the now strained relations of the Spanish
banks  with  Latin  America).  In  other  words,  globalisation  of  banking  is
certainly not limited to the European market place.
All  this  induces  us  to  consider  the  ‘revolution’ scenario  merely  as  an
exceptional  case,  occurring  almost  by  accident,  by  some  mysterious
chemistry  between  the  heads  of  financial  institutions.  And  even  if  this
chemistry occurs, its implementation may be neutralised or reduced by the
countervailing actions of authorities, competitors or vested interests.
This is our tentative response to the basic issue formulated at the beginning
of our study.
Brussels-Leuven, 30th June 2002
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Key figures of the top 100 European banking groups in 2000 and over the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*100ANNEX 2: Self-Organising Maps (SOM)
1. Self-Organising maps (SOM) 
A self-organising map (SOM), also called a Kohonen network, is feedward
neural network that uses an unsupervised training algorithm, and through
a process of self-organisation, configures the output units into a topological
representation of the original data (Deboeck & Kohonen, 1998).
  Neural networks are, roughly and with a slight exaggeration, simulations
of brain functioning. Within neural networks, so-called neurons are linked
to each other by connections with a certain connection strength. Through
this non-linear regression technique a model can be trained (the process of
determining  an  appropriate  set  of  weights  between  all  neurons).  The
purpose is to find a relationship between the input and the output variables
or to organise data so as to disclose unknown patterns or structures. 
  Unsupervised means that the network builds its own representation of the
data  purely  on  the  basis  of  the  input  variables  and  the  feedward
information flow.
Simply stated, SOM reduces and visualises the dimensionality of a large
multi-input data to a two-dimensional map on the assumption that similar data
(or cluster data) are formed from patterns that share common features.
The technique has a number of advantages:
– It  enables  us  to  visualise  a high  dimensional  data  set  into  a two-
dimensional map,
– It has the strong capability for generalising: the network can recognise or
characterise inputs it has never encountered before,
– it copes well with input units with missing data or fuzzy ones,
– it copes well with data where patterns are subtle or hidden.
  Training algorithm: SOM has only two layers: an input layer and an
output layer where each output node is connected to all the inputs,
which is represented by the connection weight. Before training starts,
these weights are set to initial values. Now, when an input pattern is
presented to the network, the output layer units compete with each
other until the unit is found that most resembles the input pattern. This
unit then has its weights altered to make it more like the input pattern.
In order to group similar patterns, also a neighbourhood of units around
101the winning unit is altered to be more like the input pattern. As the
training continues, the size of this neighbourhood around the winning
unit decreases. At the end of this ongoing process and after a number
of passes of the data set, only the winning unit is adjusted. As a result
different areas of the map have responded to different types of inputs
and a high-dimensional input data set is reduced to a two-dimensional
map.
When presenting an input pattern Xp, composed of input elements x0, x1,
x2, ... xn-1, to a Kohonen network with n input nodes, the weight between
an input i and a node j is given by wij.
1. Initialise the weights between inputs and the nodes.
2. Present an input x0, x1, x2, ... xn-1.
3. Compute the error measurement between the input and the weights, in
this case using the Euclidean distance
n-1
dj= ∑ (xi – wij)
2
i= 0
4. Select the node j* that has the minimum value of dj.
5. Update the weights for node j* and its neighbours to be
wij*=   w ij + ϑ (xi – wij)
where ϑ is the learning rate of the Kohonen layer, which typically
decays over time. The neighbourhood size is defined before the model
is built, and again typically decays over time.
6. Repeat steps 2 to 4 until the weights have stabilised.
2. Software tool
Anumber of software tools for applying SOM is available on the market. The
analysis in this study is based on Viscovery SOMine (version 3.0), a product
of Eudaptics GmbH . Viscovery is based on the SOM concept and algorithm,
and is considered a powerful, flexible, user-friendly tool that can be applied
in  various  financial,  economic  and  marketing  applications.  Viscovery
SOMine Standard edition is limited to 50 variables and 50,000 data records.
Data records with missing values will be recognised by Viscovery and treated
appropriately in the analysis (for more information see www.eudaptics.com).
As SOM is an unsupervised training algorithm, i.e. the map is organized
purely on the input stimuli the network receives, an evaluation tool for the
map is essential. Viscovery provides a number of map evaluation tools for
pre-processing variables and optimal clustering of the map.
102 ANNEX 2  Variable processing
A number  of  variable  processing  tools  are  available  in  Viscovery:  data
scaling, variable priority, data modification and data transformations. In our
panorama  application  only  the  use  of  variable  priority  and  data
transformations  has  been  applied.  In  the  data  transformations,  a sigmoid
transformation was used in order to handle outliers without discarding them.
  Optimal clustering
  U-Matrix
The  U-matrix  window  colours  each  node  depending  on  the  median
distance to its neighbours. Nodes that are far away from each other will
have a dark colour. Nodes that belong to a ‘dense’ region of the map will
have a bright one. Thus, the darker the colour, the higher the distance to
the neighbours. Strings of dark coloured nodes indicate a gap in the map.
  Curvature window
As  SOM  reduces  a high  dimensional  data  set  into  a two-dimensional
surface, the distribution cannot be a plane but has to bend through the data
space,  thereby  forming  curves,  saddles,  etc.  The  curvature  window
displays how much the map is bent at each node. A map is well adapted if
most areas have little curvature. High curvature should only appear locally
around the cluster boundaries. In some cases it may be useful to have
a map  with  mainly  high  curvatures  when  the  map  displays  the  data
distribution quite accurately.
  Frequency window
The frequency window indicates how many data records from the source
data  have  matched  each  node.  Nodes  that  have  not  matched  any  data
record are white. Nodes that have matched at least one data record are
displayed in shades of red. The darker the node, the higher the frequency
of matches.
A map is well adapted if the frequencies are equally distributed.
  Quantisation error window
The quantisation error window measures how good the source data are
matched by a specific node. The quantisation error is necessarily zero
(white)  at  nodes  where  no  data  records  have  matched.  Non-zero
quantisation errors are displayed in shades. The darker the node, the higher
the error. A map is well adapted if the quantisation errors are very small
and equally distributed over the map.
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Fig. A: U-matric panorama 1995–2000
U-Matrix – Viscovery 1995-2000 final
Fig. B: Curvature window panorama 1995–2000
Curvature – Viscovery 1995-2000 final
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Fig. C: Frequency window panorama 1995–2000
Frequency – Viscovery 1995-2000 final
Fig. D: Quantization error panorama 1995–2000
Quantization Error – Viscovery 1995-2000 final
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